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accidents, medical malpractice, product related accidents, environmental injuries, and workplace injuries. 
In each case, the paper proceeds by reviewing empirical evidence on the deterrence and compensatory 
properties of the tort system, and then reviews parallel bodies of evidence on regulatory or penal 
alternatives and on compensatory alternatives to the tort system. The paper concludes that the deterrent 
properties of the tort system seem strongest with respect to auto accidents and weakest with respect to 
environmentally related accidents. The incentive effects of the system are mixed in the case of medical 
malpractice and product related accidents, making net welfare judgments problematic. In the case of 
workplace accidents, workers' compensation levies appear to have stronger deterrent effects than the tort 
system did have or might have if resurrected in this context. With respect to an expansive distributive 
justice perspective, the tort system appears to fail badly in all five areas, with the failure being most 
severe with respect to environmentally related injuries, product related injuries, and medically induced 
injuries. With respect to a corrective justice perspective, the tort system appears to perform reasonably 
well in the automobile accident context, but much less well with respect to medically induced injuries and 
environmentally related injuries. With respect to product related accidents, its performance is unclear. As 
to the alternatives to the tort system, regulatory achievements with respect to workplace safety, product 
related accidents, and medical malpractice appear to have been modest. In environmentally related 
accidents and, more qualifiedly, traffic related accidents, regulatory policies appear to have registered 
notable successes, although in some cases generating costs disproportionate to the benefits. As to 
compensatory alternatives to the tort system, these have so far played a marginal role with respect to 
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tort system. With respect to workplace injuries or disabilities, workers' compensation schemes appear to 
deliver relatively complete compensation for pecuniary losses (except for long term disability) at relatively 
low administrative costs and more expeditiously than the tort system, as well as achieving significant 
safety gains. In the case of medically related injuries, experience with programmes in New Zealand and 
Sweden suggests that no-fault compensation systems are viable alternatives to the tort system. Although 
they suffer from weak internalization of accident costs to wrongdoers, these no-fault systems hold out 
the promise of compensating a wider range of victims more expeditiously and at lower administrative 
cost than the tort system. In the case of product and environmentally related injuries, no general 
compensatory alternatives to the tort system for personal injuries readily suggest themselves. The paper 
expresses doubt as to whether a general social insurance alternative to the tort system, covering both 
injuries and disabilities, with non-risk rated financial contributions and high levels of income coverage, is a 
feasible alternative to tort law for personal injuries and disabilities at large. 
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THE EFFICACY
OF THE TORT SYSTEM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES:
A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE©
By DON DE~vEEs* AND MICHAEL TREBILCOCK**
This paper reviews the existing empirical evidence on the efficacy of the
tort system and alternatives to it. The evidence is evaluated against three
normative goals: deterrence, corrective justice, and distributive justice.
Empirical evidence relating to five major categories of accidents is reviewed:
automobile accidents, medical malpractice, product related accidents, environ-
mental injuries, and workplace injuries. In each case, the paper proceeds by
reviewing empirical evidence on the deterrence and compensatory properties
of the tort system, and then reviews parallel bodies of evidence on regulatory
or penal alternatives and on compensatory alternatives to the tort system.
The paper concludes that the deterrent properties of the tort system seem
strongest with respect to auto accidents and weakest with respect to
environmentally related accidents. The incentive effects of the system are
mixed in the case of medical malpractice and product related accidents,
making net welfare judgments problematic. In the case of workplace
accidents, workers' compensation levies appear to have stronger deterrent
effects than the tort system did have or might have if resurrected in this
context. With respect to an expansive distributive justice perspective, the tort
system appears to fail badly in all five areas, with the failure being most severe
with respect to environmentally related injuries, product related injuries, and
medically induced injuries. With respect to a corrective justice perspective, the
tort system appears to perform reasonably well in the automobile accident
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context, but much less well with respect to medically induced injuries and envi-
ronmentally related injuries. With respect to product related accidents, its
performance is unclear.
As to the alternatives to the tort system, regulatory achievements with
respect to workplace safety, product related accidents, and medical
malpractice appear to have been modest. In environmentally related accidents
and, more qualifiedly, traffic related accidents, regulatory policies appear to
have registered notable successes, although in some cases generating costs
disproportionate to the benefits.
As to compensatory alternatives to the tort system, these have so far
played a marginal role with respect to medical, product, and environmentally
related personal injuries. In the case of traffic related accidents, the empirical
evidence suggests that various kinds of no-fault compensation systems can
deliver compensatory benefits, at least for pecuniary losses, at lower
administrative costs and with greater speed than the tort system. Even with
substantial risk rating of premiums or contributions to such schemes, there is
still a debate whether a significant loss in deterrence arises from curtailment or
abolition of the tort system.
With respect to workplace injuries or disabilities, workers' compensation
schemes appear to deliver relatively complete compensation for pecuniary
losses (except for long term disability) at relatively low administrative costs and
more expeditiously than the tort system, as well as achieving significant safety
gains.
In the case of medically related injuries, experience with programmes in
New Zealand and Sweden suggests that no-fault compensation systems are
viable alternatives to the tort system. Although they suffer from weak
internalization of accident costs to wrongdoers, these no-fault systems hold out
the promise of compensating a wider range of victims more expeditiously and
at lower administrative cost than the tort system.
In the case of product and environmentally related injuries, no general
compensatory alternatives to the tort system for personal injuries readily
suggest themselves. The paper expresses doubt as to whether a general social
insurance alternative to the tort system, covering both injuries and disabilities,
with non-risk rated financial contributions and high levels of income coverage,
is a feasible alternative to tort law for personal injuries and disabilities at large.
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I. THE EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
In evaluating the efficacy of the present tort system with respect
to personal injuries and alternatives to it, it is obviously necessary to be
clear at the outset about the criteria against which they are to be
evaluated. Unfortunately, controversy begins with this threshold
question. First, there is fundamental disagreement as to the goals that
the tort system is designed or can be designed to serve.1 Second, even
where there is agreement on objectives, there is profound uncertainty
about what the empirical evidence proves as to how well the tort system
1 See, for example, M.J. Trebilcock, "The Future of Tort Law: Mapping the Contours of the
Debate" (1989) 15 Can. Bus. LJ. 471.
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achieves those objectives, or how much better or worse alternative
systems are likely to do in promoting those same objectives.
Law and economics scholars, drawing on concepts of economic
efficiency, tend to stress the deterrent objectives of the tort system.
They evaluate existing legal doctrine or proposed reforms in terms of
whether appropriate incentives are created for the various causal
contributors to a given personal injury to minimize the sum of accident
and avoidance costs by taking cost justified precautions which will
reduce the likelihood and severity of that outcome.2
Scholars who adopt a less individualistic, more communitarian
perspective on tort law (such as many Critical Legal Studies scholars)
view most accidents as the inevitable by-product of the activities (for
example, motoring and manufacturing) that an industrialized,
interdependent society has collectively decided to embrace. They are
sceptical that economic incentives, such as legal internalization of
accident costs to least-cost accident avoiders of them, are likely to have a
significant impact on risky behaviour. Drawing instead on notions of
distributive justice, these scholars stress that accident costs should be
borne collectively, not individually, and that the tort system should be
evaluated in terms of its capacity to spread risk and provide meaningful,
expeditious, and low-cost compensation or insurance to the victims of
these activities 3
More classical tort scholars, drawing on Aristotelian and Kantian
theories of corrective justice, stress notions of individual responsibility,
as do law and economics scholars. However, they view the purpose of
tort law, not as deterrence of prospective wrongdoers, but rather as
obliging a person whose morally culpable behaviour has violated
2 See, for example, S. Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1987); A.M. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 2d ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1989); R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott,
Foresman, 1988) c. 8; and W.M. Landes & R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
3 See, for example, S.D. Sugarman, "Doing Away with Tort Law" (1985) 73 Calif. L. Rev. 558;
S.D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal Injury Law (New York: Quorum Books, 1989); H.J
Glasbeek & R.A. Hasson, "Fault-the Great Hoax" in L. Klar, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) 395; T.G. Ison, The Forensic Lottery (London: Staples, 1967); R.L.
Abel, "The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims" (1987) 68 Ohio St. LJ. 443; A.C. Hutchinson,
"Beyond No-Fault" (1985) 73 Calif. L. Rev. 755; and Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation
for Personal Injury in New Zealand (Wellington: A.R. Shearer, Government Printer, December
1967) (Chair: The Honourable Justice A-O. Woodhouse) [hereinafter Woodhouse Report].
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another's autonomy to restore the latter as nearly as possible to his or
her pre-injury status.4 In contrast, economists generally regard issues of
interpersonal equity as being outside their disciplinary domain.
This summary description of the three major normative
perspectives on tort law obscures important differences of viewpoint
among scholars and judges who espouse one or the other of these
general perspectives, and thus risks misstating the precise implications of
each perspective. However, the summary suggests the general lines of
empirical enquiry that must be pursued. It is obviously difficult to
formulate a coherent tort law reform agenda without resolving these
fundamental differences in philosophical perspectives on the tort system.
To the extent that these differences rest in part on different empirical
assumptions about the actual operation of the present tort system and its
alternatives, the following assessment of the existing empirical evidence
on the efficacy of the tort system and its alternatives may help bridge the
differences.
For all three major goals of the tort system, the performance of
the system can be evaluated by examining both inputs and outputs. Our
analysis of inputs assumes that, if a particular set of theoretical assump-
tions is empirically satisfied, then the tort system is likely to realize its
stated goal. We focus, then, on whether the assumptions are satisfied by
legal doctrines or empirical facts. The analysis of outputs examines per-
formance itself, first identifying what changes the tort system has in fact
induced, then judging whether these changes are of a kind or scale that
satisfy the stated normative goal.
A. Deterrence
Assuming that one goal of the tort system is to discourage
socially undesirable conduct or activities, our analysis proceeds in both
of the following ways.
4 See, for example, EJ. Weinrib, "Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law" (1983) 2 Law
& Phil. 37; "Liberty, Community, and Corrective Justice" (1988) 1 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 3; and
"Understanding Tort Law" (1989) 23 Val. U.L Rev. 485.
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1. Input Evaluation
The deterrence goal is likely to be well served if empirical
evidence suggests that most victims of wrongdoing have ready access to
the legal system without excessive barriers to suit; that legal standards
are certain and well understood by the parties subject to them; and that
damage principles confront the defendant with the full social costs of
wrongdoing without abandoning incentives.
2. Output Evaluation
To measure deterrence outputs, we look for behavioural changes
in care or activity levels among violators and then the effects of such
behavioural changes on the injury rates among victims. Obviously, if no
significant effects are observable, one can hardly argue that the tort
system is an effective instrument of deterrence. The more difficult case
is the one in which observed behavioural effects can reasonably be
attributed to the tort system; but there are serious questions as to
whether they reflect full attainment of optimal deterrence, or perhaps
reflect a net reduction in social welfare through excessive deterrence
(such as the alleged curtailment of obstetrical services as a response to
medical malpractice litigation). Making empirical judgments about how
close the-real world is to the social optimum, and what contributions the
tort system has made to whatever state of optimality or suboptimality is
observed, is a highly perilous endeavour. Our judgments on this
critically important issue will necessarily be somewhat tentative. This
concern is mitigated somewhat when one adds to the ledger our
empirical evaluation of the input measures of performance.
B. Corrective Justice
1. Input Evaluation
An input evaluation of this goal focuses on many of the same
kinds of factors that are relevant to an input evaluation of the deterrence
goal: whether victims have ready access to the legal system, whether
costs of enforcing rights are excessive, whether legal standards are
[VOL- 30 NO. 1
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certain and well understood by the parties subject to them, and whether
damage rules ensure full redress to victims for all consequences of
wrongdoing.
2. Output Evaluation
We assess progress towards the corrective justice goal by trying
to answer the following questions: (i) What fraction of wrongfully
injured accident victims actually receives compensation?; (ii) How
frequently are damages awarded to those not wrongfully injured, or
against those not wrongfully causing the injury?; and (iii) Is the measure
of compensation actually received adequate or excessive?
C. Distributive Justice
1. Input Evaluation
To serve the goals of distributive justice, the desired inputs
include: victims with ready access to the legal system; no excessive costs
of bringing suit; victims who are well informed as to their rights and the
facts giving rise to risks of injury (these factors being common to input
evaluations of deterrence and corrective justice); legal standards that
impose liability on efficient risk-spreaders, such as large corporate
enterprises with "deep pockets"; and damage rules that provide optimal
"insurance" or compensation.
2. Output Evaluation
Realization of the goal of distributive justice might be measured
through the following questions: (i) What fraction of injured accident
victims receives compensation from the tort system?; (ii) Is the measure
of compensation actually received adequate or excessive?; and (iii) What
administrative costs and delays are entailed in providing compensation
to victims?
We believe that the success of the tort system in achieving any of
the goals discussed above is likely to differ significantly among substan-
tive areas of law. Among the relevant factors are the certainty of liability
1992]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
standards, the complexity of causation and scientific issues, the
availability and pricing of first and third party insurance coverage (public
and private), the sophistication of plaintiffs, the size of defendants and
the competitiveness of their economic environment, and the concen-
trated or dispersed nature of harms.
Regulatory and compensatory alternatives to the tort system will
also be evaluated within the same framework that we have applied to the
tort system.
In this paper, we examine separately five substantive areas of tort
law: traffic accidents, medical malpractice, product related accidents,
workplace accidents, and environmental injuries. Each of these areas
represents a major source of personal injury claims. Collectively, they
cover a wide variety of the conditions that are likely to affect the success
of tort law in attaining its goals. For each of the five substantive areas,
drawing on a much larger study commissioned by the American Law
Institute,5 we summarize and interpret the available empirical literature
using the input and output modes of analysis described above. We first
evaluate the tort system and then regulatory and compensatory alter-




With respect to input analysis, economic analysis suggests that
the Learned Hand test of liability for negligence can, in theory, induce
efficient levels of driving care. On the other hand, since it is virtually
impossible to consider driving frequency as a component of the standard
of care, a negligence regime does not discourage socially excessive
driving activity: each driver's decision on how much to drive need not
account for the risk of non-negligent accidents whose costs fall on
others.
5 D.N. Dewees & M.J. Trebilcock (with D. Duff), The Efficacy of the Tort System and its
Alternatives: A Review of the Empirical Evidence (Philadelphia: American Law Institute)
[forthcoming].
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If the tort system is to encourage efficient precautions to avoid
automobile accidents, drivers must face the full social cost of all
accidents attributable to their failure to exercise adequate care.
However, three features of the contemporary law of damages contradict
this theoretical ideal and imply that there will be underdeterrence of
automobile accidents through the civil liability system: (a) judicially or
legislatively imposed caps on pain and suffering damages; (b) collateral
source offsets in many jurisdictions; and (c) substantial undercompen-
sation for wrongful death.6 With respect to claims initiation, Canadian
evidence suggests that a very high percentage of persons injured in
motor vehicle accidents who have a valid tort claim make such a claim.
7
British evidence suggests that a somewhat lower percentage of victims
with valid tort claims make such claims-perhaps as few as 75 per cent
As to claims resolution, it appears that both the settlement and
adjudicative system are able to resolve relatively accurately most claims
of fault. In one u.s. study of 352 insurance claims, more than 90 per cent
of cases involved uncontroversial evidence of fault As to the impact of
third party liability insurance on safety incentives, insurers in many
jurisdictions employ co-payment mechanisms (coverage restrictions,
co-insurance percentages, and/or explicit deductibles) and premium
rating schemes to ensure rough congruity between expected costs and
individual premiums. While any deviation from perfect risk rating is
bound to affect the precision of the tort system's deterrent signal,
compared to other areas of civil liability, automobile insurance employs
features that retain much of tort law's deterrence incentives. Finally, as
to driver responsiveness to the incentive effects of the tort system, at
least some driving patterns that are significantly correlated with acci-
dents, such as speeding or drunk driving, are likely to be responsive to
6 W.K. Viscusi, "Alternative Approaches to Valuing the Health Impacts of Accidents:
Liability Law and Prospective Evaluations" (1983) 46:4 Law & Contemp. Probs. 49 at 67-68.
7 S.A. Rea, "Compensation for Automobile Accident Victims in Ontario: A Simulation" in
Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Financial Institutions, Report of
Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Ontario, vol. 2 (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1988) (Commissioner: Coulter A. Osborne) 336 at 392-93 [hereinafter Osborne Report, vol. 2] and
Dewees & Trebilcock, supra, note 5 at 7.
8 D. Harris et al., Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984) at 72.
9 CJ. Bruce, "The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the
Empirical Literature" (1984) 6 Law & Pol'y 67 at 69.
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the tort system's incentives. This is less clear, though, with respect to
momentary acts of inadvertence, where possible tendencies of some
individuals to discount low-probability risks may reduce driver respon-
siveness to the tort system's deterrence signals, at least relative to
various penal or regulatory alternatives.
With respect to output analysis of the deterrence effects of the
tort system, most of the empirical evidence focuses on the safety effects
of moving from a third party tort liability insurance system to some form
of first party no-fault compensation system. The u.s. evidence in this
context is hopelessly ambiguous: some studies find significant erosion of
safety incentives in moving from tort to no-fault,10 while other studies
find no significant relationship between no-fault automobile legislation
and the rate of fatal accidents.1 1 It should be borne in mind, though,
that almost all u.s. no-fault programmes retain substantial elements of
fault liability, whether the programmes take the form of add-on or
threshold no-fault. In contrast, Quebec adopted in 1978 a pure no-fault
system, one which precludes all rights of tort action for personal injuries
arising out of automobile accidents and which provides a flat-priced
schedule of benefits under a state administered compensation scheme.
The evidence about this policy move is much less ambiguous.
Two studies have examined the effect of introducing this no-fault
scheme on Quebec's rate of motor vehicle accidents. Gaudry found a 7
per cent increase in automobile fatalities (on the order of 100 additional
fatalities a year),12 while Devlin found an even larger increase in fatal
accidents (on the order of 150 a year).13 Gaudry attributes the bulk of
this increase to two factors: the flat rate premium structure adopted
under the Quebec scheme, which reduces the cost of motoring for
certain high-risk drivers (such as young male drivers), who were previous-
10 M.H. Medoff & J.P. Magaddino, "An Empirical Analysis of No-Fault Insurance" (1982) 6
Evaluation Rev. 373 and E. Landes, "Insurance Liability and Accidents: A Theoretical and
Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents" (1982) 25 J.L & Econ. 49.
11 P. Zador & A. Lund, "Re-analysis of the Effects of No-Fault Auto Insurance on Fatal
Crashes" (1986) 53 J. Risk & Ins. 226 and P.S. Kochanowski & M.V. Young, "Deterrent Aspects of
No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings" (1985) 52 J. Risk & Ins. 269.
12 M. Gaudry, "The Effects on Road Safety of the Compulsory Insurance, Flat Premium
Rating and No-Fault Features of the 1978 Quebec Automobile Act" in Osborne Report, vol. 2,
supra, note 7 at 1.
13 R.A. Devlin, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: An Analysis of the
Experience in Quebec (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, 1988) [unpublished].
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ly priced off the Quebec highways under third party tort liability insur-
ance, and to more stringent enforcement of compulsory insurance
requirements, which induced previously uninsured drivers to reduce care
levels. Devlin, on the other hand, attributes a substantial part of the
increase in fatalities to a reduction in average driving care. Gaudry's
research suggests that proper risk rating of first party insurance
premiums would take care of the activity level effect to which he largely
attributes the increase in fatalities. In Devlin's analysis, even with full
risk rating, significant erosion of driving safety incentives would still
occur. Australian evidence is broadly consonant with the Quebec
experience. McEwen finds that the adoption of comprehensive no-fault




With respect to input analysis, how available is first party
insurance for automobile accidents, and what proportion of drivers
voluntarily purchase such insurance? Both u.s. and Canadian data
suggest that most drivers in both tort and no-fault jurisdictions carry
substantial amounts of first party health insurance, but that only a
minority of individuals are protected against the risk of income loss from
long term disability.15 Whether this coverage is optimal depends on the
likelihood of market failure. For example, on the demand side, is there
evidence that drivers have insufficient information about the risks in
driving and therefore purchase less than optimal coverage against them?
Even if this information is available, do drivers systematically undervalue
certain risks, such as low-probability events entailing serious injury if
they occur? The psychological evidence suggests that there may be
problems of both underestimation and overestimation of such risks.
1 6
14 1. McEwen, "No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australasian Evidence" (1989) 9 Int'l
Rev. L. & Econ. 13.
15 R. Houchens, Automobile Accident Compensation, Volume IIl" Payments from All Sources
(Santa Monica: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand, 1985) at 25 and D. Hensler et al., Accidents and
Injuries in the U.S.: Costs, Compensation, and Claiming Behavior (Santa Monica: Rand, 1990) at 17.
16 See D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases"
(1974) 185 Science 1124. Compare W.K. Viscusi, Tort Liability and Regulation: The Economic Basis
forAssigning Institutional Roles (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1987).
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Also, to the extent that accident victims can externalize the cost of their
own injuries to *others (for example, public health or welfare systems),
does this lead to the purchase of socially suboptimal amounts of first
party insurance (and attendant moral hazard problems)? Although,
strictly speaking, it is not a form of market failure, having limited
financial resources may prevent the purchase of voluntary first party
insurance by some drivers. It is not clear, however, how this concern is
met by compulsory first party insurance. On the supply side, one would
need to investigate whether under a voluntary first party insurance
system adverse selection problems may inhibit the supply of private
voluntary first party insurance to some or all classes of drivers. So far as
we know, there is no systematic evidence available on these issues.
Where inadequate coverage is provided through voluntary first
party insurance, tort law can be viewed from a distributive justice
perspective as a form of mandatory insurance system. From this
perspective, one would first need to inquire whether eligibility -criteria
and benefit levels provided through the tort system reflect sound
insurance principles. The notion of ex ante moral hazard may be able to
justify restricted or reduced compensation under rules of contributory or
comparative negligence. However, an expansive distributive justice per-
spective cannot sustain current tort principles that compensate only
those automobile injuries that are attributable to the negligence of a
third party with sufficient assets or liability insurance to reimburse the
losses caused. Nor can it excuse the traditional "guest passenger" rule,
still existing in some u.s. states, that bars guest passengers (either
completely or unless gross negligence is established) from recovering
from host drivers.17
On the other hand, fault-based liability is broadly consistent with
the corrective justice principle that only wrongfully injured victims
should be entitled to recovery from wrongdoers through the tort system.
However, from a corrective justice perspective, a distinct judicial expan-
sion of the negligence concept in the automobile context and legislative
provisions reversing the onus of proof in automobile accident claims and
making owners of insured vehicles vicariously liable for the negligence of
anyone driving with their permission indicate a pervasive tendency of
compensatory goals to steer negligence doctrine away from traditional
17 J.K. Hammnitt, Automobile Accident Compensation, Volume l Payments by Auto Insurers
(Santa Monica: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand, 1985) at 7.
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notions of fault. Conversely, the incidence of uninsured and
underinsured drivers, particularly in u.s. states in which liability
insurance is either optional or compulsory at relatively low minimum
policy limits, implies that, despite the expanded reach of liability rules,
many wrongly inflicted injuries will remain "uncorrected" or
"undercorrected" through the tort system.
Turning to the issue of benefit levels, the tort system contradicts
sound insurance principles in three respects. First, even though
transaction costs suggest that rational individuals would self-insure
against small losses and purchase first party insurance against relatively
large losses, tort law pays damages for all losses regardless of how trivial
they may be. Second, to the extent that the tort system provides
recovery for non-economic losses, the law and economics literature
raises serious questions as to whether parties would rationally buy
coverage for these forms of losses.18 Finally, whereas optimal insurance
requires the rationalization of all sources of coverage to minimize
premium costs and thus prevent unnecessary overinsurance, the
collateral source rule frustrates this result by prohibiting the deduction
from tort awards of indemnity payments otherwise receivable.
The tort process of claims disposition is even more problematic
on compensatory grounds. Insurance principles would emphasize the
importance of prompt remuneration to address immediate medical
needs, to respond to sudden disruptions to employment income and
household services, and to initiate immediate steps toward physical and
vocational rehabilitation. However, the tort method of lump sum
payments by parties who are adverse in interest to the victim implies
considerable delay in initiating a flow of compensation to meet pecu-
niary losses as they accrue. Furthermore, this result is also inconsistent
with insurance principles to the extent that inadequate liability coverage
and the process of claims settlement frequently result in payments that
are considerably less than full economic losses, especially the larger,
more serious losses. Finally, from an insurance perspective one needs to
know whether the third party tort liability insurance system entails
administrative costs that exceed the- overhead in public or private first
18 See, for example, S.A. Rea, "Non-Pecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract" (1982) 11 J.
Legal Stud. 35 and G.L. Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law" (1987) 95
Yale LJ. 1421 at 1546-47.
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party regimes. As we note below, significant administrative cost savings
seem to be realizable under no-fault first party compensation systems.
With respect to output analysis of the compensation effects of
the tort system, a series of u.s. and Canadian studies conducted in the
1960s found that fewer than 50 per cent of individuals injured in traffic
accidents, including those seriously injured on the road, received any
compensation at all from the tort system.19 Even though doctrinal and
insurance reform during the intervening decades have made the fault
system "more compensatory" in orientation, 20 recent u.s. evidence
suggests that between a third and a half of claimants under first party
no-fault systems would not qualify under a third party tort insurance
system, either because there was no other negligent driver or because
their own negligence barred recovery. 1 When compensation from all
sources is considered, the compensation gap between no-fault and third
party tort insurance regimes significantly narrows, but does not
disappear. 22 Of the remaining 50 to 70 per cent of injured victims with
valid tort claims, a further percentage is undoubtedly unable to recover
fully from judgment-proof defendants. Although we have found no
systematic evidence on the extent of this phenomenon, it has been
reported that between 8 and 11 per cent of u.s. motorists are
uninsured,23 and this rate reportedly rises to more than 20 per cent in
several states,24 and to almost 70 per cent in urban areas like Detroit and
Los Angeles? 5 Output analysis of benefits paid through the tort system
reveals the operation of liability and quantum rules, as well as the effects
19 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1973) at 51 (Table 5) and U.S. Department of
Transportation, Compensating Auto Accident Victims: A Follow-up Report on No-Fault Auto
Insurance Eqeriences (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 1985) at 73-74.
20 U.S. Department of Transportation, ibid. at 74 n. 11.
21 J. Rolph, Automobile Accident Compensation, Volume . Who Pays How Much How Soon?
(Santa Monica: Institute for Civil Justice, Rand, 1985) at 17 and Hammitt, supra, note 17 at 48.
2 2 Houchens, supra, note 15.
23 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra, note 19 at 76.
24 Hammitt, supra, note 17 at 19.
25 Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Financial Institutions, Report
of Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Ontario, vol. 1 (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1988) (Commissioner: Coulter A. Osborne) at 480 [hereinafter Osborne Report, vol. 1] and G.T.
Schwartz, "A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans" (1987) 48 Ohio
St. L.J. 419 at 424.
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of the claims settlement process and inadequate liability coverage. A
recent u.s. study concludes that between 2 and 10 per cent of negligent
paid claimants receive incomplete compensation for economic losses on
account of their own negligence.2 6 Although no more than 30 per cent
of negligent paid claimants in any state surveyed received special
damages less than their economic loss, there is a marked relationship
between comparative negligence and both a reduced likelihood of, and a
lower quantum of, general damages. 27 This suggests that total settle-
ments are regularly reduced on account of claimant fault, even if this
fact is not explicitly reflected in listed amounts for special damages.
Consistent with the tort principle of full recovery for all losses,
paid claims surveys also reveal the extent to which tort suits are
dominated by relatively minor injuries with small economic losses, and
by payments for non-pecuniary losses. According to a recent survey in
Ontario, the vast majority of paid claims involved nominal injuries
(victim "shaken up") or injury to soft tissue.28 Of the mere 50 per cent
of those claimants who suffered measurable work time loss, almost 45
per cent lost four weeks or less, and only 19 per cent experienced time
loss of more than six months 29 In total, 46 per cent of all liability
payments were for non-pecuniary damages and a further 5 per cent for
family law actions for loss of care, guidance, and companionship 30
Recent u.s. data confirm this pattern, indicating that over 60 per cent of
automobile liability payments relate to non-pecuniary damages. 31
Canadian and u.s. data also confirm the extent to which the
collateral source rule promotes wasteful overinsurance and double
recovery. According to a recent Ontario study, when all sources of
compensation were considered, the roughly 30 per cent of claimants with
collateral benefits in addition to compulsory no-fault benefits (deducted
from tort awards) received compensation for loss of employment income
equal to almost 136 per cent of their gross lost wages 3 2 In the United
26 Hammitt, supra, note 17 at 29.
27 1"bid at 30 and 39-40.
28 Osborne Report, vol. 2, supra, note 7 at 548-49 (Question 24).
29 Ibid. at 551 (Question 28).
30 Osborne Report, vol. 1, supra, note 25 at 258 (Figure 7.7).
31 Hammitt, supra, note 17 at 32.
32 Osborne Report, vol. 1, supra, note 25 at 430-31.
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States, nearly 20 per cent of motor vehicle victims surveyed reported
recovery from more than one source; many of these individuals were
paid twice their economic loss or more23 Almost half of those with
private health insurance failed to submit claims, mainly because they had
already been compensated from another source 3 4
Notwithstanding overcompensation of some claimants, when all
sources are taken into account, empirical evidence also reveals a
consistent tendency of the tort system to undercompensate victims with
large economic losses. 35 Insufficient liability coverage appears to be a
significant factor here. Although recent u.s. data concludes that policy
limits prevent no more than 0.5 per cent of claimants from recovering
their full economic losses, this figure rises to 5 per cent in a low-
minimum policy limit state like Massachusetts 6 Moreover, those whose
damages are limited in this manner are disproportionately the small
minority of accident victims suffering severe or catastrophic injuries. On
average, these claimants have economic losses of almost $18,000 and
obtain payments $10,000 smaller than their losses 37
As to the timeliness of compensation, u.s. and Canadian studies
disclose considerable delays in the payment of third party benefits,
particularly to claimants with serious injuries involving higher pecuniary
losses and a greater likelihood of litigation and attorney involvement.38
In contrast, first party insurance plans display a marked ability to initiate
a stream of payments to accident victims much more quickly than the
third party tort liability insurance system s 9 The experience in Quebec,
where a pure no-fault scheme was introduced in 1978, is summarized in
Table 1.
33 Houchens, supra, note 15 at 5 and 31-32.
34 kid at 27.
35 See, for example, R.L. Bombaugh, "The Department of Transportation's Auto Insurance
Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform" (1971) 71 Colum. L. Rev. 207 at 213; Ontario
Law Reform Commission, supra, note 19 at 51 (Table 4); and S. Carroll et aL, No-Fault Approaches
to Compensating People Injured in AutomobileAccidents (Santa Monica: Rand, 1991).
36 Hammitt, supra, note 17 at 29-30.
371bid at 29.
38 Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 19 at 56-63; U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation, supra, note 19 at 70; and Hammitt, supra, note 17 at 54.
39 Osborne Report, vol. 2,supra, note 7 at 546 (Questions 18C and 22) and 569 (Question 18);
U.S. Department of Transportation, ibid. at 79; and Carroll et aL,supra, note 35.
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Table 1
Percentage of Victims Compensated by Month (Quebec)40
Duration Tort System No-Fault
Less Than One Month 5% 32%
Less Than Two Months 12% 70%
Less Than Three Months 18% 84%
Less Than Six Months 35% 96%
More Than Six Months 65% 4%
No-fault schemes also exhibit a comparative advantage over the
tort system with respect to administrative costs. Comparing an average
net payout ratio of 50.2 cents on the dollar in threshold no-fault states to
the figure of 43.2 cents in traditional tort states, the u.s. Department of
Transportation concludes that "a no-fault system is 16.2 per cent more
efficient than a traditional system, with respect to returning money paid
as premiums to victims in the form of benefits or damages." 41 Studies of
the Quebec pure no-fault system suggest that there may be cost savings
in the range of 10 to 24 per cent of earned premiums in such a system, 42
although other estimates put the savings at a much lower figure (5 per
cent).43
40 Devlin, supra, note 13 at 74. Since tort delay is based on the duration between the accident
and settlement, and no-fault delay measures the time between claim filing and first payment, this
comparison exaggerates the difference between the two systems. Nevertheless, since only about 10
per cent of tort claimants obtain advance payments before final settlement and there is little reason
to delay filing claims under the Quebec scheme, any exaggeration is probably slight.
41 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra, note 19 at 83.
42 Devlin, supra, note 13 at 249-57.
43 Osbome Report, vol. 1, supra, note 25 at 528. For U.S. evidence, see Carroll et aL,supra,
note 35.
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C. Penal and Regulatory Alternatives to the Tort System 44
Almost 50,000 Americans and over 4000 Canadians die in traffic
related accidents every year. Many times that number sustain personal
injuries and property damage. The private and social costs of traffic
accidents are enormous. While aggregate traffic fatalities rose fairly con-
sistently over time in most industrialized countries since the introduction
of the automobile, they peaked in the u.s. and Canada in the mid-1970s
and have since been consistently declining. Moreover, fatality rates,
measured in terms of distances driven, have consistently and
dramatically declined over time in the u.s. and other industrialized
countries.
Most of the effort to control traffic accidents historically has
been concentrated on changing driver behaviour. Police surveillance
and prosecution have dominated control strategies. However, beginning
in the late 1950s, attention has no longer focused exclusively on drivers'
care levels and prevention of crashes. Traffic safety experts and even-
tually policy makers began to realize that the damage sustained in
crashes could be reduced by other forms of regulation that focused on
the external environment, such as motor vehicle and highway design.45
This epidemiological perspective has, in turn, been challenged by
"risk compensation" theorists,46 who argue that regulatory reductions in
expected accident costs may induce adaptive behaviour by drivers who
will consume safety gains as performance benefits by increasing risks on
unconstrained margins.
While a vast amount of public resources and court time continue
to be directed to the prosecution of traffic offenses, there is surprisingly
little firm evidence as to the effects of criminal sanctions on the traffic
accident rate. Several studies that have examined the effects of police
4 4 The following review is largely derived from M.L. Friedland, M.J. Trebilcock & K. Roach,
Regulating Traffic Safety (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). See also L. Evans, Traffic
Safety and the Driver (New York. Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1991).
4 5 See W. Haddon, "A Logical Framework for Categorizing Safety Phenomenon and Activity"
(1971) 12 J. Trauma 193 and W. Haddon & S. Baker, "Injury Control" in D. Clark & B. MacMahon,
eds, Preventive and Community Medicine, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981).
46 See, for example, S. Peltzman, "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation" (1975) 83 J.
Pol. Econ. 677 and J.G.U. Adams, Risk and Freedom: The Record of Road Safety Regulation
(London: Transport Publicity Projects, 1985).
[VOL 30 NO. 1
Efficacy of the Tort System
slow-downs as a result of labour disputes, or differential enforcement
levels from one location to another, have tended to find no immediate
measurable impact on the frequency or severity of traffic accidents.
47
More systematic evidence on the long term effects of changes in
sanctions or enforcement policy has tended to focus on seat-belt use,
speeding, and drunk driving.
With respect to seat-belt legislation, mandatory seat-belt laws,
even with low levels of enforcement and relatively trivial penalties,
appear to increase use rates dramatically. Moreover, increased seat-belt
usage appears to reduce significantly the injury rate, and the safety gains
do not appear to be offset by adaptive driver responses.48 The experi-
ence with respect to the enforcement of speed limits is somewhat more
mixed than with respect to the enforcement of seat-belt laws. The
effects of police surveillance appear to be quickly dissipated once it is
withdrawn. 49 Moreover, police surveillance efforts are often, because of
ease of enforcement, directed at "fishing holes" where violators are
easily apprehended, but where speeds in excess of legal limits often do
not pose serious safety hazards. The empirical evidence suggests that
variance in speed is more important than absolute speed in causing
accidents. A number of studies have found that the greater the absolute
deviation from mean traffic speed, the higher the accident rate.SO This
suggests that speed limits should not be set so low as to encourage
massive violations and higher variance in speed, and that enforcement
activity and severity of sanctions should be targeted at drivers who are
guilty of substantial deviations from mean traffic speeds, even though
this may pose greater enforcement difficulty. With respect to drunk
47 See, for example, A.F. Carr, J.F. Schnelle & R.E. Kirchner, "Police Crackdowns and
Slowdowns: A Naturalistic Evaluation of Changes in Police Traffic Enforcement" (1980) 2
Behavioral Assessment 33; and J.A. Gardiner, Traffic and the Police: Variations in Law Enforcement
Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969).
48 B.A. Jonah & J.J. Lawson, "The Effectiveness of the Canadian Mandatory Seat Belt Use
Laws" (1984) 16 Accident Analysis & Prevention 433 and Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Road Safety Research: A Synthesis (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1986).
49 U.S. National Research Council, Committee for the Study of the Benefits and Costs of the
55 m.p.h. National Maximum Speed Limit, 55: A Decade of Experience (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Transportation Research Board, 1984) (Chair: A. Altshuler).
50 U.S. Department of Transportation, Synthesis of Safety Research Related to Traffic Control
and Roadway Elements (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 1982) at 17-2
and 17-6.
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driving, the evidence of the efficacy of criminal sanctions is also
somewhat mixed. Spot-check programmes of the kind that have become
prevalent in many jurisdictions appear to have a largely transitory effect
on driver behaviour.51 However, year-round massive breath testing of
the driving population accompanied by extensive publicity campaigns
designed to emphasize the certainty and severity of punishment (as has
been introduced in the Australian state of New South Wales) 52 does
appear to have a significant impact on both the incidence of drunk
driving and the underlying accident rate.
Licensing regimes have now become a major adjunct to criminal
sanctions in controlling drivers' care and activity levels. The empirical
evidence tends to show that raising the driving53 and drinking54 age has a
significant effect on accident rates, as do graduated licensing regimes,55
especially for young drivers, who are heavily overrepresented in the
accident statistics.
With respect to motor vehicle safety design, early evidence was
controversial and contested. It now appears to be clear that, on balance,
safety design standards have substantially reduced fatality and injury
51 H.L. Ross, Deterring the Drinking Driver: Legal Policy and Social Control (Toronto:
Lexington Books, 1984).
52 1. Kearns et aL, "An Overview of the Random Breath Testing Trial in New South Wales" in
P. Noordzij & R. Roszbach, eds, Alcoho Drugs and Traffic Safet -T86 (Amsterdam: Excerpta
Medica, 1987) 429.
53 A. Williams et al., "Variations in Minimum Licensing Age and Fatal Motor Vehicle
Crashes" (1983) 73 Am. J. Pub. Health 1401.
54 M. DuMouchel et al., "Raising the Alcohol Purchase Age: Its Effects on Fatal Motor
Vehicle Crashes in Twenty-Six States" (1987) 16 J. Legal Stud. 249 and H. Saffer & M. Grossman,
"Beer Taxes, the Legal Drinking Age and Youth Motor Vehicle Fatalities" (1987) 16 J. Legal Stud.
351. Compare M. Males, "The Minimum Purchase Age for Alcohol and Young Driver Fatal
Crashes: A Long Term View" (1986) 15 J. Legal Stud. 181.
55 Conditions may be attached to the exercise of the license over the first several years of
licensing, for example, night-time and weekend curfews, driving only with adults and without
teenagers, license suspensions may be triggered by lower blood-alcohol levels than apply to adults or
by the commission of other moving violations that might not trigger license suspensions in other
cases. See D.R. Mayhew & H.M. Simpson, Graduated Licensing: State of Knowledge and Current
Practices (Ottawa: Traffic Injury Research Foundation, 1984).
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rates with benefits exceeding costs, except on the most pessimistic
estimates of costs and benefits.
5 6
With respect to highway safety design improvements, there
seems to be considerable potential for safety gains from such improve-
ments, but identification of problem locations and choice of design
countermeasure to date has typically been quite unsystematic, and little
is confidently known about relative cost-benefit payoffs from alternative
highway design measures.
57
With respect to post-accident injury care, the empirical evidence
seems to suggest significant potential health gains from improved
trauma systems58 and improved long term rehabilitation programmes.5 9
However, in the nature of things, such programmes can only ameliorate
the status of a very small subset of traffic injury victims.
Because of the resources devoted both to directly reducing the
toll on the highways and to researching its causes, one might have
assumed that the effects of these various interventions are well
understood. In fact, there is little consensus on what works and what
does not work. In particular, we do not have robust empirical findings
that suggest where the greatest payoff lies on the marginal dollar
devoted to traffic safety. This is the central policy issue that traffic safety
research has barely begun to confront. Without a more robust empirical
consensus on this issue, it is not possible at this time to dismiss the
effects of the tort system as irrelevant to the traffic safety calculus.
D. Compensatory Alternatives to the Tort System
Although automobile no-fault compensation schemes differ
significantly from one jurisdiction to the next, first party no-fault
insurance for automobile injuries typically compensates the pecuniary
56 R.W. Crandall et aL, Regulating the Automobile (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute,
1986); J.D. Graham, Auto Safety: Assessing America's Performance (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House,
1989); and J.L. Mashaw & D.L. Harfst, The Struggle forAuto Safety (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press, 1990).
57 See J.F. Carney, ed., Effectiveness of Highway Improvements (New York: American Society
of Civil Engineering, 1986).
5 8 D.D. Trunkey, "Trauma" (1983) 249 Scientific American 28.
59 U.S. Department of Transportation, supra, note 19 at 107-12.
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losses of more traffic victims more promptly and at lower administrative
cost than tort/third party liability arrangements.
Compared to other no-fault plans, add-on schemes that provide
first party no-fault benefits in addition to tort entitlements return a
relatively high proportion of the automobile injury premium dollar to
traffic victims, but entail considerably higher coverage costs. Conse-
quently, add-on no-fault benefits are typically quite modest and fail to
diminish significantly primary reliance on tort compensation for
automobile injuries.60 In turn, add-on schemes tend to manifest the
same compensatory deficiencies found in the tort system. On the other
hand, except where no-fault payments are deducted from tort awards,
they preserve whatever deterrence and corrective justice qualities are
associated with tort actions for automobile injuries.
Threshold schemes that eliminate tort claims below some loss or
injury severity threshold are more diverse in the level of no-fault benefits
available and in the extent to which they reduce tort actions for auto-
mobile injuries. However, they seem best able to provide generous
benefits at acceptable administrative and premium costs where high
verbal or monetary thresholds exclude a substantial percentage of no-
fault claimants from pursuing a tort claim. Most problematic is why,
except for purely political reasons,61 these schemes allow tort actions
where damages exceed stipulated thresholds. Although it is arguable
that non-pecuniary compensation is warranted for permanently and
seriously disabled or disfigured accident victims who suffer a large loss of
enjoyment of life,62 it is not clear why these benefits should be
channelled through the tort system and made contingent upon fault,
instead of included as part of the no-fault package, as in Quebec.
Further, it is questionable whether serious injuries per se especially
engage deterrence or corrective justice rationales for tort liability, since
such injuries may be caused by minor inadvertence on the part of the
injurer rather than egregious misconduct.63
60 Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 19 and D. Caldwell, "No-Fault Automobile
Insurance: An Evaluative Survey" (1977) 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 909.
61 Osborne Report, vol. I, supra, note 25 at 326.
62 ibid. at 468.
63 MJ. Trebilcock, "Incentive Issues in the Design of 'No-Fault' Compensation Systems"
(1989) 39 U.T.L.J. 19 at 47.
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Pure no-fault schemes appear to score highest with respect to the
speed and adequacy of no-fault payments (at least for pecuniary losses),
reduced administrative costs, and low overall automobile injury
insurance costs; but they are least impressive in terms of corrective
justice and deterrence considerations. Finally, although elective
schemes have the virtue of permitting motorists to choose the
compensation regime in which they will participate, 64 they risk severe
adverse selection problems which, over time, are likely to turn them into




Let us consider first the key input factors. Liability in the
medical malpractice context is determined by reference to standards of
customary practice rather than a direct cost-benefit calculus. Whether
the customary practice standard is socially optimal is debatable. On the
one hand, information asymmetries and provider self-interest suggest
that customary standards might well fall beneath the optimal level. On
the other hand, extensive health insurance coverage implies that
customary practice may lead to unduly high levels of medical care, since
patients may externalize to health insurers some or all of the costs of
additional precautions employed. As to damage rules, just as was true of
automobile accidents, there are three reasons for supposing that the
amount of awards may lead to underdeterrence: (a) caps on non-
pecuniary damages; (b) collateral benefit offsets in a number of
jurisdictions; and (c) undercompensation for wrongful death. As to
claims initiation, the u.s. evidence is that the ratio of malpractice claims
to negligent medical injuries is still only one to eight (one to sixteen for
paid claims), and a substantial proportion of the claims are brought by
64 J. O'Connell & R.H. Joost, "Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault
Insurance" (1986) 72 Va. L. Rev. 61.
65 J.L. Carr, "Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance: An
Economic Critique" (1989) 26 San Diego L. Rev. 1087.
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patients who were not negligently injured.6 6 As to the incentive effects
of liability insurance, unlike automobile liability insurance, explicit
co-payment mechanisms and/or experience rating are virtually non-
existent in the medical liability insurance context, as opposed to rating
by region and specialty category.
Turning now to output 'analysis, it is useful to consider first the
impact of civil liability on patterns of medical practice and then the likely
relationship between these intermediate responses and the ultimate
medical injury rate. As to the impact of the liability system on care
levels of individuals, two econometric studies in the u.s. have found
statistically significant correlations between increases in malpractice
premium levels (using this as a proxy for the risk of malpractice suit) and
the frequency of physician use of specific diagnostic procedures. 67
Second, several u.s. and Canadian surveys of physicians have recorded
changes in practice patterns that respondent physicians ascribed to the
threat of malpractice liability.68 In addition to increased record keeping
and communication with patients and other health care professionals, a
substantial percentage of doctors attribute increased diagnostic testing
(such as amniocentesis and electronic fetal monitoring) and specific
treatment procedures (such as caesarian sections) to the liability threat.
However, these surveys also reveal that practice patterns are strongly
shaped by patient demand and professional considerations. Third, three
empirical studies have attempted to trace how a significant change in a
66 Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study to the State of New York, Patient, Doctors,
and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New York
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 1990) c. 7 [mimeo] [hereinafter Harvard Study].
6 7 B. Greenwald & M. Mueller, "Medical Malpractice and Medical Costs" in S. Rottenberg,
ed., The Economics of Medical Malpractice (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1978) 65 and R.A. Reynolds, J.A. Rizzo & M.L. Gonzalez, "The Cost of
Medical Professional Liability" (1987) 257 J.A.M.A. 2776.
68 See, for example, Liability and Compensation in Health Care (App. B: vol. 2) (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990) (Chair: J.R.S. Prichard), especially the following submissions in
c. 4: F. Sellers, "Report on the Survey of the Impact of Medical/Legal Liability on Patterns of
Practice"; W. Hannah et al., "Submission of Working Group on Obstetrics and Gynaecology"; C.A.
Woodward & W. Rosser, "The Impact of Medical/Legal Liability on Patterns of General and
Family Practice in Canada"; and M.M. Cohen, J. Wade & P.G. Duncan, "The Effect of Liability on
the Provision of Anesthetic Care." See also Professional Liability and Effects (Washington, D.C.:'
American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 1988); Harvard Study, supra, note 66, c. 9;
and B. Dickens, "The Effects of Legal Liability on Physicians' Services" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 168.
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particular rule has affected physician behaviour.69 At least two of the
studies-one expanding the scope of informed consent in Canada70 and
the other expanding the obligations of mental health care professionals
regarding potentially violent psychiatric patients7l-found a significant
impact on subsequent physician practice.
With respect to the impact of civil liability on the activity levels
of physicians, liability concerns may cause practitioners to curtail or
discontinue high risk practice areas. A number of u.s. and Canadian
physician surveys report this result, particularly among obstetricians,
gynaecologists, certified nurse-midwives, and among general
practitioners and family physicians who previously performed obstetrical
and prenatal care, anesthesiology, or emergency room services.7 2 As
with changes in practice patterns, though, other factors such as lifestyle
and family considerations are reported as major reasons for changes in
practice scope. It is difficult, then, to isolate the marginal impact of
malpractice liability alone. Concerns about suit may also encourage
physicians to move from highly litigious regions to areas with lower
claims frequency and lower malpractice premiums. However, recent
empirical studies have found little relationship between the malpractice
environment and physicians' location decisions.73 Third, the choice of
new entrants into the profession might be affected by liability
considerations. According to one recent u.s. survey, for example, the
percentage of fourth year medical students selecting obstetrical residen-
69 J. Wiley, "The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study"
(1981) 55 S. Cal. L Rev. 345; G.B. Robertson, "Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study"
(1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 139; DJ. Givelber, W.J. Bowers & C.L. BItch, "Tarasoff, Myth &
Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action" (1984) Wis. L. Rev. 443; and G. Robertson,
"Informed Consent Ten Years Later: The Impact of Reibl v. Hughes" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 423.
70 Robertson, ibid.
71 Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra, note 69.
72 See, for example, S.C. Charles, C.E. Pyskoty & A. Nelson, "Physicians on Trial-Self-
Reported Reactions to Malpractice Trials" (1988) 148 West J. Med. 358; D. Lewis-Idema, "Medical
Professional Liability and Access to Obstetrical Care: Is There a Crisis?" in Institute of Medicine,
Committee to Study Medical Professional Liability and Delivery of Obstetrical Care, Division of
Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of
Obstetrical Care, vol. II (vashington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989) (Chair: RJ. Bulger) 78
[hereinafter Medical Professional Liability]; Hannah et aL, supra, note 68; Woodward & Rosser,
supra, note 68; and Cohen, Wade & Duncan, supra, note 68.
73 G. Burghardt, "Medical Malpractice and the Supply of Physicians" in The Economics of
Medical Malpractice, supra, note 67, 103 at 119 and Greenwald & Mueller, supra, note 67 at 73.
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cy fell from nine in 1984 to seven in 1987.74 However, these data are not
particularly refined or robust.
The evidence concerning the impact of practice changes on the
ultimate medical injury rate is quite fragmentary and inconclusive.
Although commentators suggest that increased record keeping leads to
better medical care, no studies strongly support this view. It is also
questionable whether fuller communication to patients of treatment
risks and alternatives has any ultimate impact on the medical injury rate,
although patient demand for such disclosure indicates that many
patients find this a benefit in its own right. The marginal gains from lia-
bility induced diagnostic and treatment procedures are also uncertain.
Recent evidence casts doubt on the utility of electronic fetal monitoring,
amniocentesis, caesarian sections, and certain other technologically
sophisticated procedures, suggesting even that these are sometimes
harmful to patients.75 To the extent, then, that tort liability has induced
more use of these procedures, it is not at all clear that doing so has
reduced the injury rate. The relationship between liability induced activ-
ity changes and the trends in medical injuries is even harder to assess.
To the extent that liability fears cause some physicians to curtail or
discontinue high-risk practice settings, some commentators welcome
more litigation on the grounds that it may discourage excessive use of
expensive and invasive procedures. 76 Similarly, to the extent that quality
of care is inversely related to physician age and directly related to
physician training and specialization, early retirement or restrictions on
the scope of general family practice may reduce the injury rate. On the
other hand, some reported activity level responses to the threat of
liability may reduce patient access to care, especially in rural areas or
among the poor. In that event, a difficult social calculus must be faced:
deciding whether patients are really better off with less ready access to
more specialized practitioners, as compared to readier access to phy-
sicians with a somewhat more disparate range of expertise.
Notwithstanding these ambiguities in the evidence on the
deterrent effects of the medical malpractice system, a recent
74 Cited in B.P. Sachs, "Is the Rising Rate Cesarean Sections a Result of More Defensive
Medicine?" in Medical Professional Liability, supra, note 72, 27 at 36-37.
75 bid. at 75-82.
76 See, for example, R.H. Brook, R.L. Brutoco & K.N. Williams, "The Relationship Between
Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care" [1975] Duke LJ. 1197 at 1211.
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econometric analysis undertaken by the Harvard Medical Practice Study
Group, focusing on widely varying rates of claims per negligent adverse
event across the New York State hospital system, yielded this estimate:
the elasticity of negligent injuries to tort litigation implies that for ,every
10 per cent increase in malpractice claims, there will be a 4 per cent
reduction in negligent injuries.7 7 Set against this result is the fact that
Canadian doctors are one-fifth as likely to be sued for malpractice as are
u.s. doctors, and Canadian malpractice premiums are one-tenth those in
the u.s.; yet there appears to be no evidence that Canadian physicians
are more careless than their u.s. counterparts. 78
These somewhat speculative gains from malpractice liability in
reducing the medical injury rate must, of course, be compared to the
costs of such liability. The best u.s. estimates of the total cost of
specifically liability related practices yield an estimate of nearly $11
billion annually.79 Moreover, this estimate does not include the
transaction costs of the tort system, the foregone income and the
emotional trauma sustained by physicians involved in malpractice claims,
and the public cost of providing the court system. Danzon has estimated
that for the costs of the tort system to be justified, as a first approx-
imation, there would have to be one medical accident (of equal severity)
avoided for every one compensated by the tort system-a ratio which the
Harvard data fall well below.80
B. Compensation
Just as was true of first party voluntary automobile insurance,
there is some reason to suppose that patients, left to their own devices,
may purchase less than optimal insurance. Limited economic resources
may induce poorer patients to prefer the risk of uncertain future losses
77 P.C. Weiler & T.A. Brennan, Medical'Injuries and Malpractice Litigation: Findings of the
Harvard MedicalPractice Study, (September, 1990) at 103 [mimeo] [unpublished].
78 D.N. Dewees, M.J. Trebilcock & P.C. Coyte, "The Medical Malpractice Crisis: A"
Comparative Empirical Perspective"(1991) 54:1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 217.
79 Reynolds, Rizzo & Gonzalez, supra, note 67 at 2778. This estimate is in 1984 dollars and
includes direct premium costs and the additional expenditures on liability induced physician
procedures.
80 P.M. Danzon, "Medical Malpractice Liability" in R.E. Litan & C. Winston, eds, Liability
Perspectives and Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brooldngs Institute, 1988) 101 at 117-18.
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to the certain cost of present premiums. Because individuals do not
always bear the full cost of the accidents they experience, they may
decline to purchase the socially optimal level of private insurance. To
the extent that patients have inadequate information about the risks of
medical treatment or undervalue low-probability risks of serious injury,
inadequate insurance may also be purchased. Finally, to the extent that
insurers find it difficult to segregate risk pools, incomplete insurance
coverage may arise from imperfect information on the supply side of the
market.81 Given these factors, civil liability is viewed by many as a
means of ensuring some protection for those who would otherwise be
without compensation in the event of a disabling medical injury.
Examination of the existing medical malpractice system,
however, casts doubt on this system's efficacy as a scheme of compulsory
insurance, let alone as a source of any hoped for wealth redistribution.
Three features of the contemporary law of damages suggest that the
existing malpractice system pays considerably higher benefits than those
suggested by optimal insurance analysis. First, although the problem of
moral hazard typically requires benefits at somewhat less than full
recovery, the general principle of tort damages requires full recovery.
Second, although economic analysis challenges the wisdom of insuring
against non-pecuniary losses, current damages law provides for recovery
for pain and suffering. Third, whereas optimal insurance would avoid
wasteful duplication by compensating only losses not already covered by
other sources, traditional tort law prohibits deducting from the award
benefits received from collateral sources. Viewed from a more expan-
sive distributive justice perspective, the eligibility criteria of the
malpractice system leave it woefully inadequate as a compulsory insur-
ance scheme, with only a tiny fraction of iatrogenic injuries-injuries
attributable to medical care-leading to tort recovery of any amount.82
Turning to an analysis of outputs, of all negligently injured
patients, only about 13 per cent are estimated to initiate a claim for
medical malpractice; of those who do seek tort compensation, only
about 50 per cent are successful. Considering the empirical evidence
that only 27 per cent of all medical injuries involve provider negligence,
81 For example, one estimate suggests that only 20 per cent of the employed U.S. labour force
is privately insured against the risk of general long term disability. See P.M. Danzon, "Tort Reform
and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets" (1984) 13 J. Legal Stud. 517 at 523.
82 See Harvard Study, supra, note 66.
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these figures suggest that less than 2 per cent of injured patients receive
compensation through the tort system.
83
Moreover, the procedural arrangements for malpractice compen-
sation have two further consequences that undermine the insurance
function of the tort system. First, tort compensation is notoriously slow
compared to administrative compensation. While benefits are usually
forthcoming two weeks after a legitimate unemployment payment is
filed, three weeks after an uncontested workers' compensation claim,
and four months in the case of a contested workers' compensation claim,
recent u.s. data on the disposition of medical malpractice claims reveal
an average duration between injury and claims disposition of roughly
three years.84 In the case of claims involving serious permanent
disability and the largest dollar amounts, four year delays are common.
Second, the combined effects of delayed compensation,
difficulties of proof, litigation costs, and the often pressing needs of
injured plaintiffs produce settlements of claims at sums significantly less
than the amount that in principle should have been payable for the
injury. In one study of malpractice claims, for example, Danzon reports
that settlements averaged 74 per cent of the amount that would likely
have been awarded at trial.85 According to a more recent u.s. survey of
over 18,000 paid malpractice claims, aggregate indemnity payments
totalled only 33 per cent of the aggregate economic losses associated
with the claims.86 As is true of automobile accident claims, shortfalls in
compensation of economic losses increase markedly with the size and
severity of the claim. The reason is that the settlement process operates
in a regressive manner by placing the greatest pressure to settle on those
with the fewest resources and the most severe injuries.
As to administrative costs, Weiler estimates that the existing u.s.
malpractice system spends roughly 55 to 60 cents to deliver between 40
83Tbid.
8 4 U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed in
1984 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, April 1987) at 32-35"[hereinafter GAO
Claims Study].
85 P.M. Danzon & L.A. Lillard, "Settlement-Out-Of-Court: The Disposition of Medical
Malpractice Claims" (1983) 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 at 346.
86 Calculated from the GAO Claims Study, supra, note 84 at 44-45. Of course, some of this
shortfall may reflect weakness in the merits of the plaintiff's case.
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and 45 cents into the hands of injured patients.8 7 In contrast, benefits
paid account for roughly 95 per cent of federal social security costs. And
to the extent that the costs of the civil liability/malpractice insurance
system are passed on to patients through medical fees, all patients pay
the same implicit insurance premium regardless of their income,
although benefits depend in major part on income related pecuniary
losses. The result is that low-income patients are required to subsidize
the protection given to high-income patients.
Finally, though the formal features of the medical malpractice
law comport better with corrective than with distributive justice, the fact
remains that only a very small percentage of negligently injured patients
even initiate claims, let alone obtain compensation.
C. Regulatory Alternatives to the Tort System
Over 80 per cent of all u.s. medical malpractice claims closed in
1984 involved an injury arising in a hospital setting.88 Recent Canadian
data confirm the centrality of the hospital setting with respect to
malpractice claims, finding that over 90 per cent of all large claims
(accounting for over half of total payouts) arose out of incidents in
hospital settings.8 9 Two large scale and independent studies of hospital.
records-one undertaken in California in the mid-1970s9 0 and the recent
Harvard Medical Practice Study of New York hospitals91-yield closely
similar findings, indicating that approximately 4 per cent of all
hospitalizations result in adverse events from medical treatment
(iatrogenic injuries) and one quarter of these incidents involve
substandard care. The Harvard Study extrapolates New York's adverse
event related death total to the u.s. population as a whole and estimates
87 P.C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1991) at 139.
88 GAO Claims Study, supra, note 84 at 24-25.
89 D.N. Dewees, P.C. Coyte & M.J. Trebilcock, "Canadian Medical Malpractice Liability: An
Empirical Analysis of Recent Trends" in Liability and Compensation in Health Care (App. B: vol. 1)
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990) (Chair: J.R.S. Prichard) c. 3.
90 D.H. Mills, "Medical Insurance Feasibility Study-A Technical Summary" (1978) 128 West
J. Med. 360.
91 Harvard Study, supra, note 66.
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that there may be 150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, over half of
these deaths being due to negligence. Medical injury thus exceeds the
mortality rate associated with motor vehicle accidents (about 50,000 per
death) and occupationally related mishaps (6,000 per year).92 As data
cited above indicate, the tort system in practice addresses only a tiny
fraction of the iatrogenic injury phenomenon and a very small fraction of
negligently caused medically adverse events. Do other quality control
regimes more effectively address this phenomenon?
With respect to individual physicians, the principal quality
control mechanism traditionally has been licensing regimes and
correlative disciplinary sanctions operated by state medical boards.
However, in terms of input analysis, there are reasons for a priori
scepticism as to how well licensing and discipline regimes are likely to
operate as quality control mechanisms. 93 First of all, there is little
incentive for patients to report cases of negligence or incompetence to
such boards. Indeed, a 1976 New York survey asking people where they
would file a complaint against a physician found that not one respondent
mentioned the Medical Licensing Board.94 The linkage between
malpractice claims (even paid claims) and the licensing discipline
regimes is virtually non-existent, and collegial norms seem strongly to
discourage reporting by fellow physicians of cases of negligence or
incompetence by other physicians. Despite various estimates that
between 2 per cent and 10 per cent of all u.s. physicians are
unscrupulous, unethical, delinquent, or incompetent, 95 a 1971 u.s.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare report commented that
"disciplinary action by Medical Boards is almost insignificant in terms of
the universe of practising physicians," adding that "data indicate a
tendency towards leniency even in the relatively few cases that result in
92 Weiler & Brennan, supra, note 77 at 28.
93 See MJ. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality in Professional Markets" in D.N. Dewees,
ed., The Regulation of Quality: Products, Services, Workplaces, and the Environment (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1983) 92 [hereinafter The Regulation of Quality] and A. Donabedian, "Evaluating the
Quality of Medical Care" (1966) 44:3 Milbank Mem. Fund Q. 166.
94 S. Law & S. Polan, Pain and Profit: The Politics of Malpractice (New York: Harper & Row,
1978) at 44-45.
95 R. C. Derbyshire, "How Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?" (1983) 7 Law & Hum.
Behav. 193 at 195; D.B. Hogan, "The Effectiveness of Licensing: History, Evidence, and Recom-
mendations" (1983) 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 117 at 124; and P. Williams, "Abandoning Medical
Malpractice" (1984) 5 J. Legal Med. 549 at 573.
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formal board sanction." 96 In the ten years between 1969 and 1978, only
3,623 actions were launched by American state medical boards, an
average of only 362 each year.97 While this number had increased to 569
by 1981, this still represented only 0.14 per cent of all licensed physicians
in the United States. Furthermore, in 1981, state medical boards took
no action in 15 states comprising a total physician population of 34,300. 98
Although the Federation of State Medical Boards reported a 37 per cent
increase (from 1,540 to 2,108) in disciplinary actions against physicians
between 1984 and 1985, the latter figure still represented only 0.38 per
cent of the nation's 552,716 licensed physicians at the time.99 Moreover,
disciplinary action is not generally related to competence, but to other
aspects of professional ethics. Most disciplinary actions involve drug
related offenses, criminal charges, sexual impropriety, or abetting
unlicensed persons to practice medicine.1 00 Between 1970 and 1975,
only eight physicians in the u.s. were disciplined for incompetence. 101 Of
disciplinary actions taken in 1985, roughly half were related to improper
prescription of drugs, and a physician's personal drug or alcohol abuse
accounted for roughly 25 per cent of the total 02
Moreover, according to Gaumer,103 initial licensure criteria are
heavily based on considerations other than practice performance,
namely on a test of student performance; that is, the standard of
competence is the assimilation of the concepts and scientific content of
the educational programme. Performance in the treatment of clients is
not part of the screening protocol. In the medical context, considerable
research suggests that academic grades are useful only for predicting
96 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report on Licensure and Related Health
Personnel Credentialing (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), cited in
Hogan, ibid. at 124.
97 Derbyshire, supra, note 95 at 197.
98 Ibid
99 U.S. General Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: A Framework for Action
(Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1987) at 13 [hereinafter Medical Malpractice].
100 Law & Polan, supra, note 94 at 33.
101 Ibid. at 34.
102 W. Gellhorn, "Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap Compensation
(N.Z.)" (1988) 73 Cornell L. Rev. 170 at 181.
103 G.L Gaumer, "Regulating Health Professionals: A Review of the Empirical Literature"
(1984) 62 Milbank Mem. Fund Q. 380 at 397.
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future grades or results on tests similar to those used in establishing the
grades. One study comparing the practices of a group of 500 physicians
to performance in formal education disclosed a relationship of almost
complete independence. 10 4 Roughly a quarter of all medical boards do
not believe that they adequately screen out inept practitioners. 10 5 In
addition, licensure requirements may often have adverse effects on both
the cost and quality of health care. Often licensure requirements impose
explicit limits on numbers of aides and prohibit the performance of
certain tasks by non-licensees. Sox, for example, reports that nurse
practitioners and other mid-level personnel can competently perform
many services currently restricted to physicians.10 6 Lave and Lave
estimate that 80 per cent of pediatric practice could be carried out by
personnel with considerably less training than specialized physicians.
10 7
Indeed, by increasing health care costs and encouraging malutilization of
hospital personnel, particularly para-professionals, some licensing
requirements may actually decrease the overall health status of the
population. 108
Given rapid advances in medical knowledge and techniques,
mandatory continuing medical education (cME) in recent years has often
been imposed as a condition of license retention. However, a number of
studies of the efficacy of CME find little or no effect on practice conduct
or on quality of patient care.10 9 Gaumer concludes that "the only
demonstrably reliable way to monitor continued competence and
remedy deficiencies is through the use of 'output monitoring' and
corresponding deficiency-oriented training."110  To this end, the
emergence of Quality Assurance Programmes, often promoted by third
104 P.B. Price et aL, "Measurement of Physician Performance" (1964) 39 J. Med. Ed. 203.
105 W.H. Dornette, "Role of the Healing Arts Licensing Board in the Current Medical
Malpractice Crisis" (1976) 4 J. Legal Med. 9.
106 H.C. Sox, Jr., "Quality of Patient Care by Nurse Practitioners and Physician's Assistants: A
Ten-Year Perspective" (1979) 91 Annals Internal Med. 459.
107 J.R. Lave & L.B. Lave, "Medical Care and its Delivery: An Economic Appraisal" (1970)
35 Law & Contemp. Probs. 252.
108 Gaumer, supra, note 103 at 384.
109 See ibid. at 399; C. Brown & H. Uhl, "Mandatory Continuing Education--Sense or
Nonsense?" (1970) 312 J.A.M.A. 1660; and J. Williamson, M. Alexander & G. Miller, "Continuing
Education and Patient Care Research" (1976) 201 J.A.M.A. 118.
110 Gaumer, supra, note 103 at 407.
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party insurers, which focus on regulation of specific practices to ensure
individual compliance with predetermined standards seem more
effective in reducing substandard care.111 Identification of physicians
falling below acceptable minimum standards requires reliance on
systems of peer review, practice audits, utilization reviews, tissue and
death reviews, and incident reports; remedial measures involve
education targeted to specifically identified problems.112
Hospital accreditation programmes that accord hospital
privileges to individual physicians provide another potential check on
quality of care, although little is known about how rigorously
accreditation procedures are applied. Given the centrality of hospital-
based incidents in the medical malpractice data, there is reason for
scepticism as to how well accreditation regimes operate as a screening
device. More recently, partly in response to the expansion of civil
liability and partly in response to regulatory requirements enacted by
state legislatures to this effect, many hospitals have adopted extensive
risk management programmes. These programmes integrate systems for
the identification of unexpected outcomes and risks, centralize data on
all such identified risks, and result in communication of this information
to other clinical and administrative departments and to quality assurance
and credentials committees. They also involve the organization of
educational programmes to minimize the risk of harm to patients; the
development of specific programmes tailored to particular institutions to
address high risk clinical areas; and the review of remedial action by a
facilities risk manager charged with the task of implementing, co-ordi-
nating, and effectuating the risk management programme.113 Along
similar lines, a number of jurisdictions now require accreditation of
hospitals themselves (in addition to individual practitioners with hospital
privileges). Alternatively, institutional accreditation is required as a
condition of participation in Medicare and Medicaid programmes.
Institutional accreditation requires satisfaction of pre-established
physical, technical, and personnel standards. The enactment of the u.s.
111 Donabedian, supra, note 93.
112 M.R. Chassin & S.M. MeCue, "A Randomized Trial of Medical Quality Assurance:
Improving Physicians' Use of Pelvimetry" (1986) 256 J.A.M.A. 1012.
113 MedicalMapractice, supra, note 99 at 17.
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Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986,114 which inter alia creates a
national data bank to house information acquired through mandatory
reporting by insurance companies and by hospitals, state licensing
boards, peer review organizations, and other bodies granting privileges
or imposing duties on physicians holds out some promise for more
systematic quality review both at the individual physician and
institutional levels.
D. Compensatory Alternatives to the Tort System
In the past decade, two fault-based alternatives to the current
tort system have been proposed as means of compensating more victims
of medical injuries more rapidly, more efficiently, and more equitably:
neo-no-fault, first outlined in a number of articles by tort scholar Jeffrey
O'Connell,115 and administrative fault, most recently proposed by a joint
project of the American Medical Association and over thirty u.s. medical
specialty societies.
116
Established either contractually or by statute, a neo-no-fault
scheme for medical injuries would empower health care providers to
compel or encourage injured patients to settle their claims at an amount
equal to their net economic losses (including attorneys' fees), provided
that this sum is offered to the victim within 180 days of the patient's
discharge from a medical facility or from the occurrence of the event
giving rise to a possible malpractice claim. If no such offer is tendered,
the victim retains the right to bring a civil action under existing rules of
malpractice liability. As inducements to make such offers, O'Connell
suggests a ceiling on compensation for wage loss and a right for
defendants who make such offers to name third parties who may be
liable as participating tortfeasors. As penalties to discourage providers
from failing to offer neo-no-fault compensation, O'Connell proposes
114 42 U.S.CS. § 11101 nt. (Law. Co-op. 1989).
115 See, for example, W. Moore & J. O'Connell, "Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by
Prompt Tender of Economic Loss" (1984) 44 Loy. L Rev. 1267 and J. O'Connell, "Neo-No-Fault
Remedies for Medical Injuries: Co-ordinated Statutory and Contractual Alternatives" (1986) 49:2
Law & Contemp. Probs. 125 [hereinafter "Neo-No-Fault Remedies"].
116 American Medical Association/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, A Proposed
Alternative to the Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based
Administrative System (Washington, D.C.: American Medical Association, 1988).
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that defendants who fail to make such an offer would lose any defence
based on the patient's contributory fault, face a reverse onus of proof
once the claimant establishes a prima facie case for liability, and be liable
for successful claimants' court and counsel costs.
The recent American Medical Association/Specialty Society
proposal envisages amendments to the medical malpractice system in the
areas of eligibility for compensation, benefits paid, and most importantly
claims disposition. With respect to eligibility, administrative fault
proposes minor revisions to tort doctrines regarding the standard of care
required of a health provider and proof of a causal connection between
the defendant's negligence and the patient's injuries. It would also
eliminate the tort rule of joint and several liability, limiting defendants'
liability solely to the extent of their responsibility. With respect to
benefits, administrative fault would cap or eliminate recovery for non-
pecuniary losses and provide generous compensation for net economic
losses, deducting any payments from collateral sources. Administrative
fault would also replace civil litigation by a process of expedited claims
disposition conducting by experienced and expert adjudicators employed
by specialized medical boards.
By discouraging extensive litigation over compensation for
medical injuries, both neo-no-fault and administrative fault schemes
hold out the promise of reducing the enormous delays and adminis-
trative costs associated with tort compensation for medical injuries.
However, fault concepts remain central to both schemes, and neither
scheme increases eligibility for compensation much beyond the 17 to 27
per cent of medical injuries estimated to be caused by provider
negligence.
In addition to fault-based approaches to compensation of
medical injuries, the past two decades have also witnessed the
emergence of several schemes of no-fault compensation for patients
injured in the course of medical treatment. Comprehensive no-fault
plans, covering virtually all medical injuries, have been proposed in a
number of academic and legislative forums and were enacted in New
Zealand in 1974, Sweden in 1975, and Finland in 1987. Designated
Compensable Event (DcE) schemes compensate only specifically listed
medical injuries, optimally defined in terms of time and space rather
than medical causation per se. Although most proposals contemplate a
relatively extensive schedule of such events, existing DCE schemes are
highly context specific, compensating victims of vaccine and drug related
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injuries or infants suffering so-called birth related neurological injury
(Bpm'k). Finally, elective no-fault schemes, involving either a comprehen-
sive definition or a detailed specification of compensable injuries, enable
providers and/or patients to select a tort or no-fault option for injury
compensation.
The central challenge confronting no-fault schemes is the
definition of a compensable event. Unlike fault-based regimes which
limit compensation to medical injuries caused by substandard care,
comprehensive no-fault expands eligibility to all iatrogenic injuries.
Thus, with no-fault workers' compensation plans, the central test would
appear to be whether the injury in question arose out of and in the
course of medical treatment. However, as both theoretical analysis
117
and practical experience in New Zealand, Sweden, and Finland make
clear, the concept of iatrogenicity is by no means straightforward. First,
it is not sufficient that the patient's disability be caused by medical inter-
vention. In addition, it must be the unintended or unexpected result of
such treatment. Since many procedures entail adverse consequences as
a means of treating the patient's underlying condition, no-fault compen-
sation for purely medical injuries must exclude these cases in order not
to become a general insurance scheme for disability, however caused.
Second, iatrogenicity need not involve active medical intervention, but
may also occur where a disability is caused or aggravated by a failure to
prevent or minimize the patient's condition at a stage when it was
medically possible to do so. On the other hand, if diagnosis is medically
impossible until the condition is virtually untreatable, the outcome is
properly attributable to the underlying condition rather than medical
cause. Finally, because medical science is often probabilistic in nature,
and since iatrogenicity is typically only one element in a complex causal
chain leading to the patient's disability, both the definition and proof of
a compensable event involve difficult issues of probabilistic and
proportional causation. As a result, many proposals for comprehensive
no-fault patient compensation plans specifically limit eligibility to cases
where medical care is both a probable cause of the adverse outcome and
a significant or material cause of the resulting disability.
The New Zealand, Swedish, and Finnish no-fault plans attempt
to address these problems of causation and attribution in different ways,
11 7 See Weiler, supra, note 87 at 139-44 and Harvard Study, supra, note 66 at 2-14-2-15 and
5-9-5-16.
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although each scheme holds out the promise of increasing significantly
the number of injured patients eligible for compensation beyond the 17
to 27 per cent of all medical injuries compensable under purely fault-
based criteria. Indeed, the empirical experience under the New
Zealand118 and Swedish119 plans is that there has been a significant
increase in the number of successful claimants relative to the previous
tort system, although the evidence discloses that only about 60 to 65 per
cent of claimants under both plans actually succeed in establishing
entitlements. This evidence is consistent with the Harvard Medical
Study's findings that issues of causation, while sometimes difficult,
present fewer difficulties than judgments over fault.120
In order to help finance the expansion of eligibility to virtually all
medical injuries, comprehensive no-fault schemes typically limit or
eliminate benefits for non-pecuniary losses, restrict compensation for
income losses to a fixed percentage of pre-disability earnings up to a
stated maximum, confine payments to relatively large losses by means of
a medical expense or time loss deductible, and preclude double recovery
either by compensating only losses not already covered by collateral
sources or by establishing a right of subrogation or reimbursement by
collateral insurers for benefits paid. Both the New Zealand and Swedish
schemes appear to involve much more modest financing costs than the
u.s. medical malpractice system, as well as dramatically lower
administrative costs.
Designated Compensable Event schemes, depending upon how
ambitious they are, raise many of the same conceptual issues as
comprehensive no-fault schemes. Elective no-fault schemes entail either
contractual agreement between patients and health care providers as to
the compensation regime, a statutory provider election scheme that
binds patients to the options elected by the health care provider, or
patient election schemes which allow the patient to select the preferred
system of compensation either before receiving treatment or after the
118 See Gellhorn, supra, note 102 and 0. Woodhouse, "The New Zealand Experience" in M.
Halley et aL, eds, Medical Malpractice Solutions: Systems and Proposals for Injury Compensation
(Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1989) 171.
119 C. Oldertz, "The Swedish Patient Insurance System-Eight Years of Experience" (1984)
52 Med. Legal. J. 43; C. Oldertz, "Security Insurance, Patient Insurance, and Pharmaceutical
Insurance in Sweden" (1986) 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 635; and J. Hellner, "Compensation for Personal
Injury: The Swedish Alternative" (1986) 34 Am. J. Comp. L 613.
120 Weiler & Brennan, supra, note 77 at 40-43.
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occurrence of an injury. Elective schemes are typically favoured on the
ground that they facilitate individual choice in the selection of
compensation regimes under which one will be governed121 However,
in the medical context especially, this choice raises come serious
difficulties. First, since the market for medical services entails serious
information asymmetries between patients and health care providers,
the former may be seriously disadvantaged in efforts to obtain a fair and
efficient no-fault alternative by private contract. Second, wherever
individuals are given the option of selecting a liability regime to which
they will be subject, the possibility of adverse selection poses serious
risks as to the long term viability of the elective arrangement.
In the u.s. context, the Harvard Medical Study estimates that a
comprehensive no-fault patient compensation scheme that compensates
only net economic losses (after deducting available benefits from
collateral sources) and with a six month deductible, would entail patient
payouts in the state of New York of 894 million dollars in 1984. This
compares favourably to the roughly one billion dollars in malpractice
premiums paid in the state in 1988.122 Thus, solely in terms of costs,
some form of comprehensive no-fault compensation scheme seems a
viable alternative in the u.s. However, on the compensation side, it
would raise serious controversies as to the appropriateness of abolition
of claims for non-pecuniary losses, and, on the deterrence side, it would
raise serious controversies as to what might be lost in terms of deterrent
effects with respect to suboptimal care from the curtailment or abro-
gation of the tort system.
IV. PRODUCT RELATED ACCIDENTS
A. Deterrence
With respect to deterrence, input evaluation suggests that the
choice of liability rule does not matter if one assumes perfect
information and zero transaction costs.123 However, in circumstances in
121 See "Neo-No-Fault Remedies," supra, note 115; Weiler & Brennan, ibid. at 108; and
Sellers, supra, note 68 at 28-31.
122 Harvard Study, supra, note 66 at 11-5-11-8.
123 See, for example, Shavell, supra, note 2.
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which consumers underestimate product related accident risks, strict
liability enjoys an advantage over a negligence regime: the price of the
product will incorporate the costs of non-negligently caused accidents,
thereby producing a socially efficient demand and supply of the product.
On the other hand, strict liability exerts less control over intensity of
consumer use of a product than does a negligence regime. Thus, to the
extent that non-negligently caused accidents are a function of intensity
of use, negligence enjoys this advantage over strict liability.124
In choosing between the two regimes, much turns on the extent
to which, empirically, consumers systematically underestimate product
risks. On this question, Schwartz and Wilde argue that, if errors as to
risk are random and unbiased, producers will treat each consumer as if
he or she correctly perceives the risk. They argue that, if there is a bias
in risk misperception, it more likely reflects excessive consumer pessi-
mism about the risks of using a product, although there is some evidence
of systematic undervaluation by consumers of low-probability serious
injuries.125 Beyond these psychological generalizations, much depends
on the particular product context.
Input analysis also requires that suppliers who are held liable
under the operative liability regime confront the full social costs of
product defects, including non-pecuniary losses. To the extent that some
jurisdictions have adopted reforms that constrain awards for
non-pecuniary losses or require collateral source offsets and given
general undercompensation for fatal accidents, underdeterrence is
likely.
Apart from the choice of appropriate liability and quantum rules,
input analysis also focuses on the effect of insurance on injury avoidance
measures. Traditionally, product liability insurance premiums took little
account of individual risk-creating characteristics. However, there has
been considerable movement in the last decade away from market
insurance and toward self-insurance, and within market insurance
toward higher deductibles, higher co-insurance, and more extensive
coverage exclusions. This trend suggests that existing liability insurance
124 1bid.
125 See A. Schwartz & L.L. Wilde, "Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:
The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests" (1983) 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 and A. Schwartz,
"Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis" (1988) 97 Yale LJ. 353.
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arrangements may not seriously mute the incentive effects of the tort
system.
Finally, input analysis is concerned with the likelihood of
enforcement of a valid claim. Efficient deterrence requires that all meri-
torious claims be brought. Evidence on this question is again
fragmentary. For example, the u.s. Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion found that of 6.7 million consumers injured while using products,
fewer than 3 per cent filed claims.12 6 It is impossible to tell from this
statistic, though, how many meritorious claims (that is, claims with
respect to "defective" products) were not initiated.
With respect to output analysis of deterrence, it has been argued
that the emergence of modern strict product liability in the u.s., with
associated increases in insurance costs and reductions in insurance
availability, has resulted in a decrease in the level of socially beneficial
innovations, a reduction in availability of socially beneficial products and
services, and consumer substitution towards more dangerous
products.12 7 This argument rests primarily on anecdotal evidence.
Huber, for example, cites instances of less innovation in several
industries. He notes that research expenditures on contraceptives
peaked in 1973, then fell by 90 per cent over the next decade.128 Also,
he notes, the clinical tests for a new contraceptive (Norplant) were
stalled for over a year because of a lack of liability insurance, although
the product was already available in five other countries. He claims, as
well, that the number of vaccine manufacturers fell by half between 1965
and 1985, and that by 1986 only two companies were undertaking major
research into vaccines.1 29 These and other disaggregated statistics are
the only empirical data on which Huber bases his thesis that strict
product liability has led to less innovation.
126 See J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 5th ed. (Sydney: Law Book, 1977) at 212.
127 P.W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (New York: Basic
Books, 1988).
128 See also L. Mastroianni, P. Donaldson & T. Kane, eds, Developing New Contraceptives:
Obstacles and Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990).
129 See also U.S. Institute of Medicine, Committee on Public-Private Sector Relations in
Vaccine Innovation, Vaccine Supply and Innovation (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press,
1985) (Chair: J.P. Sanford) at 118-119.
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Estimates by Viscusi and Moore link product liability costs with
various measures of innovation. 130 With firms with significant product
patents, the average ratio of product liability insurance premiums to firm
sales is 5 per cent greater than with firms without such patents. In the
case of process patents, however, the reverse is true, as firms in
industries without process patents have a 15 per cent higher product
liability cost rate. Firms that introduce new products also have a higher
product liability burden. Thus, the two aspects of innovation most
directly related to product liability suits-product patents and new
product introductions-both indicate somewhat higher product liability
costs for innovators.
Huber also argues that the expansion of strict product liability
has been responsible for preventing the introduction and causing the
removal of socially beneficial products from the market. In support of
his argument, Huber cites a number of examples, such as the swine flu
vaccine, small airplane production, and Botulinum (a paralytic poison
used to control eye twitching). In a number of these cases, however, it is
not clear whether the withdrawal of a product was or was not socially
desirable.
A complex mix of effects is also reflected in the results of a
Conference Board survey in 1988 that found, for example, that liability
costs led to the discontinuation of product lines (36 per cent of all
respondents), decisions against introducing new products (30 per cent),
and discontinuation of product research (21 per cent).13 / Liability costs
also led to improved safety of particular products (35 per cent) or the
product line (33 per cent) and improved warnings (47 per cent).
More aggregated empirical analysis undertaken by Professor
George Priest suggests that the dramatic increase in product liability
claims has not led to any significant decrease in product related
accidents, which have only modestly declined in some contexts and
130 W.K. Viscusi & MJ. Moore, "Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Liability
and Innovation" in P. Schuck, ed., Tort Law and the Public Interest (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991)
105.
131 E.P. Mcguire, The Impact of Product Liability, U.S. Conference Board Report No. 908 (New
York: The Conference Board, 1988). See also G. Eads & P. Reuter, Designing Safer Products:
Corporate Responses to Product Liability Law and Regulation (Santa Monica: Rand, 1983) and the
empirical studies collected in P. Huber & R. Litan, eds, The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability
Laws on Safety and Innovation (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1991).
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modestly increased in others.132 However, product related accidents
statistics (such as those from the Consumer Product Safety Commission)
do not distinguish cases in which a product defect causes an accident
from those in which a product was simply involved in an accident (falling
down stairs, off stepladders, bicycles, or skateboards, or cutting oneself
on a kitchen knife). Given that the latter type of product related
accident swamps accidents involving product defects, it is not clear that
anything useful can be deduced from these data about the impact of the
tort system on product related accident rates involving defective
products.
B. Compensation
With respect to compensation, there are advantages from a
distributive justice perspective in a strict liability regime over a
negligence regime: in the former, the costs of non-negligently caused
accidents are borne by producers rather than by consumers. On the
other hand, this kind of implicit insurance has regressive features:
low-income consumers are forced to pay the same premiums as higher-
income consumers for coverage of their smaller pecuniary losses.
Moreover, from an insurance perspective, the case for awarding
non-pecuniary damages is weak, although the case for subtracting
collateral benefits in order to avoid double recoveries is stronger. From
a corrective justice perspective, a negligence regime is preferable to a
strict liability regime. However, in cases in which liability is found,
corrective justice would require liability for all losses sustained by
wrongfully injured victims, including non-pecuniary losses, and probably
would not view collateral source offsets as justified.
In terms of output analysis, the evidence suggests that the vast
majority of consumers suffering product related injuries do not take
legal action. From an insurance or distributive justice perspective, this
would suggest that the tort system is a highly inadequate source of
compensation, although it is not clear how many of these consumers are
able to claim compensation from other sources. From a corrective
justice perspective, it is crucial to know how many of those victims who
132 G.L. Priest, "Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate" in Liability Perspectives and
Policy, supra, note 80, 184.
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do not initiate claims were wrongfully injured. There are no data
available on this question. Data from u.s. asbestos claims show that the
average total compensation per closed claim was $60,000, and that after
deducting plaintiffs' legal fees and other expenses, net compensation
received by plaintiffs averaged $35,000 or 37 per cent of total
expenditures by defendants and their insurers.13 3 Given the life
threatening nature of'the diseases at issue, this amount seems very low
and likely reflects the tendency of undercompensation of fatal injuries
noted above, the general undercompensation for economic losses in the
case of serious injuries, and the many claims in which the plaintiff's
evidence regarding causation may have been weak. For asbestos claims,
the average time from filing a claim to closure was two years and eight
months; about one-third of these claims closed in one year or less, while
11 per cent took six years or more.134
Empirical evidence suggests that damages for pain and suffering
for different categories of personal injury range from 30 per cent to 57
per cent of total damage awards for product liability claims in which
bodily injury payments were received.135 Given that consumers implicit-
ly pay for this coverage in the price of products, tort law seems to be
providing more than optimal insurance. u.s. data also suggest that in
civil claims involving tort compensation for personal injuries, corporate
defendants pay on average one-third higher damages awards than do
individual defendants, holding all other factors constant.136 The tort
system is thereby being used as an insurance or risk-spreading device,
arguably desirable from a distributive justice perspective, although not
compatible with the corrective justice principle that tort law should focus
on wrongdoing irrespective of who commits it.
133 J.S. Kakalik & N.M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1986).
134 J.S. Kakalik et aL, Variations in Litigation Compensation and Expenses (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1984) at vii.
135 W.K. Viscusi, "Liability for Occupational Accidents and Illnesses" in Liability Perspectives
and Policy, supra, note 80, 155.
136 A. Chin & MA. Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets: Who Wins in Cook County Jury
Trials (Santa Monica: Rand, 1985).
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C. Regulatory Alternatives to the Tort System
In the case of product safety regulation, recent research suggests
grounds for caution in identifying targets for, and modes of,
intervention. Empirical studies of safety standards adopted by the u.s.
Consumer Product Safety Commission (cpsc) find trivial to non-existent
safety benefits from regulations pertaining to such matters as child-
resistant caps, mattress flammability standards, bicycle safety
regulations, carpet and rug flammability regulations, and children's crib
regulations.13 7 Similar studies find that even where product safety
standards do generate safety gains, often the safety benefits are
outweighed by the costs, both direct and indirect, generated by the
standards. This appears to be so, for example, with respect to urea
formaldehyde foam standards, power lawnmower standards, matchbook
standards, and architectural glazing standards.138 Similarly, a study of
FDA mandatory prescription drug regulations found little or no effect on
poisoning mortalities,139 and studies of more stringent pre-clearance
requirements for new drugs find that they have significantly reduced the
rate of new drug innovations.140 In terms of aggregate safety effects of
cpsc regulations, Viscusi finds that the impact of regulation on the home
accident rate is not statistically significant,141 although Zick, Mayer, and
Snow find that cpsc policies may have saved 18,000 lives over the first
137 See W.K. Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, 1984); W.K. Viscusi, "Consumer Behaviour and the
Safety Effects of Product Safety Regulation" (1985) 28 J. L. & Econ. 527; W.K. Viscusi, "The
Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child Resistant Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestion"
(1984) 74 Am. Econ. Rev. Pa. & Proc. 324; P. Linneman, "The Effects of Consumer Safety
Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability Standard" (1980) 23 J. L. & Econ. 461; H.G.
Grabowski & J.M. Vernon, "Consumer Product Safety Regulation" (1978) 68:2 Am. Econ. Rev.
284; R. Hirschorn, "Regulating Quality in Product Markets" in The Regulation of Quality, supra,
note 93,55; and P. Asch, Consumer Safety Regulation (New York. Oxford University Press, 1988).
138 Regulating Consumer Product Safety, ibid.
139 S. Peltzman, "The Health Effects of Mandatory Prescriptions" (1987) 30 J. L. & Econ.
207.
140 S. Peltzman, "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug
Amendments" (1973) 81 J. Pol. Econ. 1049 and H.G. Grabowski, J.M. Vernon & L. Thomas,
"Estimating the Effects of Regulation on Innovation: An International Comparative Analysis of the
Pharmaceutical Industry" (1978) 22 . L & Econ. 133.
141 W.K. Viscusi, "Consumer Behaviour and the Safety Effect of Product Safety Regulation"
(1985) 28 J. L & Econ. 527.
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decade of its existence (1972-1982).142 Since the early 1980s, the cPsc
has been required to undertake an explicit balancing of costs and
benefits of proposed safety standards. Since that time, however, it has
also dramatically reduced its standard setting activities and relied
increasingly frequently on mandatory product recalls and corrective
actions.143
Criticisms of the cPsc's performance variously stress: excessive
reliance on emergency room accident data collected pursuant to the
National Electronic Surveillance System (Niiss), which does not
distinguish injuries caused by product defects or hazards from injuries
where products were merely involved (giving undue prominence to
products posing inherent but obvious risks such as ladders, stairs,
bicycles); use of data that are not use weighted, making it impossible to
tell whether there has been a change in the level of risk or merely a
change in the utilization rate of a product; reliance on emergency room
data which underemphasizes deaths, ignores health problems, and gives
no consideration to 'property damage; failure to take account of
substitution effects between products and other behavioural responses
by consumers to more stringent safety standards, leading to over-
estimation of the benefits of regulation; increased concentration and
reduced competitiveness in some industries as a result of exit by smaller
firms unable to meet regulatory compliance costs; failure to balance
costs and benefits of proposed regulations; insufficient reliance on
information-oriented policies; and weak monitoring and enforcement
and inadequate penalties for violations, even where regulations are
justified.
142 C. Zick, R. Mayer & L. Snow, "Does the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission Make
a Difference? An Assessment of its First Decade" (1986) 6 . Consumer Pol'y 25. For a similarly
positive assessment of the effects of product safety regulation and detailed critiques of a number of
foregoing studies, see also M. Kelman, "On Democracy-Bashing: A Sceptical Look at the
Theoretical and 'Empirical' Practice of the Public Choice Movement" (1988) 74 Va. L. Rev. 199.
14 3 T. Scanlon & R. Rogowsky, "Back-Door Rulemaking: A View from the CPSC" (1984) 8:4
Regulation 27.
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On the other hand, despite early controversy,144 the most recent
(and exhaustive) study of u.S. motor vehicle safety standards finds that
regulations may have reduced fatalities by as much as 40 per cent since
the inception of NHTSA and may entail an annual reduction of fatalities of
as many as 23,000. Moreover, the study finds that the safety benefits of
these standards substantially exceed the costs, except on the most
pessimistic estimates of benefits and costs.1 45 However, like the cpsc,
NHTSA has increasingly relied on mandatory recalls rather than standard
setting, even though the safety gains from recalls, at least in the auto
context, appear to be very modest.146
The lessons to be learned from this research are that product
safety regulatory regimes need to be much more systematic and rigorous
than in the past, both with respect to identifying potential product
hazards in a pro-active, but statistically rigorous, way and in responding
appropriately to them. As a general proposition, hazard labelling and
other mandatory safety information appear to be underutilized
responses relative to minimum standards.1 47 Where standards are used,
more explicit and consistent balancing of costs and benefits is
required.148 In the absence of such an approach, data assembled by
Morrall suggest that costs per life saved or injury avoided are likely to
vary dramatically from one measure to another across the regulatory
system, implying that major reallocations of resources could generate
vastly better total payoffs from total investments in safety z49 Morrall
144 S. Peltzman, "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation" (1975) 83 J. Pol. Econ. 677; L.
Robertson, "A Critical Analysis of Peltzman's 'The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation'"
(1977) 11 J. Econ. Issues 587; L. Orr, "The Effectiveness of Automobile Safety Regulations:
Evidence from the FARS Data" (1984) 74 Am. J. Pub. Health 1384; and G. Blomquist, The
Regulation of Motor Vehicle and Traffic Safety (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publications,
1988) c. 4.
145 Crandall et aL,supra, note 56. More generally, see M.L. Friedland, MJ. Trebilcock & K.
Roach, Regulating Automobile Safety (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) c. 7 and J.
Mashaw & D. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1990).
146 Mashaw & Harfst, ibid.
147 W.K. Viscusi, W. Magat & J. Huber, "Consumer Processing of Hazard Warning
Information" (1988) 1 J. Risk & Uncertainty 201.
148 See C. Sunstein, "Paradoxes of the Regulatory State" (1990) 57 U. Chi. L Rev. 407.
149 J. Morrall, "A Review of the Record" (1986) 10:2 Regulation 25. The data assembled by
Morrall is summarized below, Table 2 at 106-107.
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notes that at one extreme are several osHA rules which address
occupation risks of one or two in 1,000 of exposed population; at the
other extreme are two FAA aircraft safety rules which address risks of two
and seven in one hundred million of exposed population. The twenty-
seven final rules reviewed by Morrall were estimated to save a total of
5,381 lives annually, which is the equivalent of about three-tenths of 1
per cent of annual u.s. deaths. The ten proposed rules (then in rule
making) were projected to save a total of only 89 additional lives per
year; the eight rejected rules were projected to save a total of only one
life per year. A very large share of the regulatory benefits of the rules
that were issued-4030 lives saved annually or 75 per cent of the benefits
of all final rules-was due to just four regulations, all dealing with motor
vehicle design (the subsequent Brookings study, noted above, yields
substantially higher safety gains from motor vehicle design standards), 5 0
Even excluding all proposed rules and the least cost-effective final rule
issued by the FDA, the range in terms of cost effectiveness is still three
orders of magnitude: osHA's arsenic standard cost nearly 1000 times as
much per life saved as NHrSA'S steering column standard. Sixteen studies
estimating individual willingness to pay for risk reduction yield estimates
that vary from about $400,000 to about $9.7 million per life saved, with a
mean estimate of $3.3 million and a median estimate of $1.7 million.
Even if one takes the highest estimate in this set of sixteen
studies-approximately $10 million per life saved-about half the
standards on Morrall's list of 44 standards entail costs per lives saved
substantially, and in many cases vastly, in excess of this figure. See Table
2, below.
150 Regulating theAutomobile, supra, note 56.
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D. Compensatory Alternatives to the Tort System
Compensatory alternatives to the tort system that are specific to
product related injuries have to date played a very limited role. In
California, Denmark, Germany, France, Japan, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom, and more recently under the u.s. National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,151 a number of jurisdictions have established,
in effect, no-fault compensation schemes for individuals suffering
adverse effects from immunization programmes. The rationale under-
lying the creation of these schemes appears to be that the state either
requires or at least strongly encourages immunization in many contexts,
and therefore should bear the responsibility for compensating
individuals who suffer adverse effects from their participation in such
programmes. Drug injury compensation schemes have been set up in
Germany, Sweden, and Japan for similar reasons. In general, these
various programmes have experienced a very low take-up rate, with the
exception of the vaccine programme in the United Kingdom.1 52
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the experience under these vaccine
and drug related injury schemes can be readily generalized to other
product related accidents, where compensation on a no-fault basis would
raise severe problems of attribution of causation and responsibility.1 53
151 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 300aa-1 et seq. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
152 W.K. Mariner, "Compensation Programs for Vaccine-Related Injury Abroad: A
Comparative Analysis" (1987) 31 St. Louis U.LJ. 599; S.A. Sturges, "Vaccine-Related Injuries:
Alternatives to the Tort Compensation System" (1987) 30 St. Louis U.LJ. 919; and J.G. Fleming,
"Drug Injury Compensation Plans" (1982) 30 Am. J. Comp. L. 297.
153 V.E. Schwartz & L. Mahshigian, "National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad
Hoe Remedy or a Window for the Future?" (1987) 48 Ohio St. LJ. 387.
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V. ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES
Because environmental pollution discharge arises from
production and consumption activities, it might be expected to increase
as those activities increase in the absence of regulation. While the total
discharge of a pollutant will depend on the level of activity in a specific
sector of the economy and on the technology of that sector, the simplest
assumption would be that discharge is proportional to population, to
overall economic activity, or to the activity in a particular sector.
Between 1970 and 1988, the u.s. population increased by 20 per cent,
real (adjusted for inflation) gross national product (GNP) increased by 66
per cent, fossil fuel use increased by 12 per cent, coal use increased by 53
per cent, and motor vehicle miles travelled increased by over 60 per
cent.154 Furthermore, while ambient pollution concentrations may be
proportional to emission rates for pollutants that are quickly removed
from the environment, such as airborne lead, carbon monoxide or
particulates, for persistent pollutants such as PcBs, dioxins, or heavy
metals in soil or water ambient concentrations may continue to increase
even if discharge rates decline, so long as there is any significant rate of
emission. Thus, even substantial emission reductions will fail to prevent
some types of continuing environmental degradation. The effect of tort
and of the regulatory system must be evaluated with these facts in mind.
A. Deterrence
Evaluating inputs, we find that tort doctrine excludes recovery in
many environmental cases. Private nuisance requires that the plaintiffs
have an interest in real property. It excludes recovery where the harm to
any individual is not substantial, where the harm is not unreasonable,
where the pollution is consistent with the neighbourhood, where the
victim is unreasonably sensitive, and where the plaintiff has come to the
nuisance.1 55 The doctrine of riparian rights applies only to injury to
riparian property, while the doctrine of prior appropriation applied in
the western United States limits the rights of junior appropriators,
154 See below, Table 3 at 117.
155 W.P. Keeton et aL,Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1984) §§ 87,88, 88A and 88B.
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excluding many harms from tort protection.156 Personal injury suits
under these doctrines are rare. Where the harm is not associated with
private property, individuals can rarely sue and governments rarely do,
so injury to public lands and general ecosystem damage are poorly
protected, as are the interests of travellers and visitors in public places.
The public trust doctrine has expanded to protect environmental and
recreational interests in navigable waters157 but is not relevant to
personal injuries.
Damage rules exclude recovery of pure economic loss or by
especially sensitive plaintiffs, and courts have been reluctant to award
damages for aesthetic or recreational loss or for the risk of future
disease.158 In the limited set of cases in which tort doctrine supports an
action, proof of causation requires that the plaintiff establish four
elements: that the plaintiff suffered actual damages, that the harm arose
from a specific pollutant, that the pollutant was of a type discharged by
the defendant, and that the defendant in fact discharged the pollutant
that harmed the plaintiff.159 This chain of causation is often impossible
to prove, especially when there are multiple polluters or substances that
cause a risk of future disease. 60 More recently, a variety of innovative
means of dealing with these problems has been discussed, including the
allocation of liability in proportion to emissions and applying general
CERCLA liability principles (retroactive strict joint and several liability) to
environmental torts not covered by CERCLA. 161 However, the cost of
litigation itself precludes lawsuits for pollutants causing small losses per
victim, even when the aggregate damage may be quite large.
156 F. Grad, Environmental Law: Sources and Problems, 3d ed. (New York: Matthew Bender,
1985) § 2.02.
157 B. Austin, "The Public Trust Misapplied: Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi and the Need to
Rethink an Ancient Doctrine" (1989) 16 Ecology L.Q. 967.
158 Keeton et al, supra, note 155.
159 "Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation" (1986) 99 Harv. L Rev. 1458 at 1617-
39 [hereinafter "Developments"].
160 T.A. Brennan, "Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in
Hazardous-Substance Litigation" (1988) 73 Cornell L Rev. 469.
161 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§
9601 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1989). See K. Abraham, "Environmental Liability and the Limits of
Insurance" (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev. 942; and "Developments," supra, note 159 at 1630-42.
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These input considerations suggest that tort will be useful
primarily for local pollution problems involving a single polluter and
very substantial damage 62 It will be of little significance for pollutants
dispersed over a large area or discharged in a developed area with many
other pollution sources, a category that includes most air and water
pollution problems.
If we focus on toxic torts involving lawsuits for personal injury
arising from environmental exposure to hazardous materials, tort law
still appears to be of limited value. In the early 1980s, a study group
mandated by CERCLA concluded that most plaintiffs face "substantial
substantive and procedural barriers in a personal injury action for
hazardous waste exposure, particularly where individual claims are
relatively small."163 The barriers include causation, the problem of
joining many victims as plaintiffs in a single action, apportionment of
damages, and statutes of limitation. The limitation problem has been
significantly alleviated by the adoption of the discovery rule in a majority
of states164 and by the CERCLA provision that state statutes of limitation
for personal injury arising from toxic waste disposal begin to run only
when the victim discovers that an injury was caused by the hazardous
substance in question.1 65
During the 1980s, litigation over damage from hazardous waste
expanded substantially,166 although claims and recoveries for personal
injuries from all environmental suits were surprisingly low.1 67 Indeed, it
appears that much of the expansion of environmental tort litigation in
the last decade related to property damage cases, where it was relatively
easy to prove that the presence of the toxic waste had reduced property
162 Many reported cases are of this type. See Grad, supra, note 156; T.A. Brennan, "Helping
Courts with Toxic Torts" (1989) 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 at 57 (discussing the Woburn case) and Envi-
ronmental Law Institute, Six Case Studies of Compensation for Toxic Substances Pollution: Alabama,
California, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Texas: A Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1980).
163 Grad, ibid. at 718.
164 "Developments," supra, note 159 at 1606.
165 42 U.S.C.S. § 9658 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
166 p. Huber, "Environmental Hazards and Liability Law" in Liability Perspectives and Policy,
supra, note 80,128 at 134.
16 7 T.A. Brennan, Narrowing the Wide Open Spaces: The Role of Torts in Environmental Law
(Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1990) at 150-56 [mimeo].
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values or required costly remedial measures. Personal injury suits
continue to be limited by the difficulty of proving causation when the
pollutant is widely dispersed and when there is scientific or statistical
uncertainty about whether an observed increase in disease more likely
than not can be attributed to exposure to the pollutant. Most successful
environmental toxic tort cases involve contaminated groundwater, which
gives physical evidence of the exposure and which causes clusters of
cases that may be found to be statistically significant.168 Still, with
respect to toxics, as with other environmental personal injuries, most
pollution discharge will not attract litigation, most polluters will pay no
compensation, and deterrence will be minimal.
Turning to outputs, an analysis of the experience with tort
litigation confirms the limited effect of the common law for dealing with
most environmental problems. Despite rapidly growing environmental
concerns during the 1970s and 1980s, we do not find evidence that tort
liability itself has significantly reduced air and water pollution discharge
in any sector, although some large polluters have been forced to abate,
and government regulations have clearly induced considerable
abatement of some pollutants from some sources. After increasing up to
1975, U.s. expenditures on pollution control equipment were steady
through the 1970s and 1980s, at less than 5 per cent of capital
expenditures.169 A recent review of the success of the environmental
policies of the 1970s and 1980s mentions tort law but accords it a
negligible role in such environmental improvement as has occurred.17 °
Histories of major air and water pollution control efforts prior to the
1970s, such as pollution abatement in Pittsburgh after World War II, do
not generally credit tort litigation with a major role.171 Most authors list
the factors discussed in the preceding paragraph as barriers to the
effective use of tort litigation for inducing pollution control.
168 ibid. at 187.
169 G. Rutledge & N. Stergioulas, "Plant and Equipment Expenditures by Business for
Pollution Abatement, 1987 and Planned 1988" (1988) 68 Surv. Current Bus. 26.
170 P.R. Portney, "EPA and the Evolution of Federal Legislation" in P.R. Portney, ed., Public
Policies for Environmental Protection (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1990) 7 at 12.
171 See, for example, T.O. Thackery, "Pittsburgh: How One City Did It" in M.I. Goldman,
ed., Ecology and Economics: Controlling Pollution in the 70s (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall,
1967) 199 and R.D. Grinder, "The Battle for Clean Air: The Smoke Problem in Post-Civil War
America" in M.V. Melosi, ed., Pollution and Reform in American Cities, 1870-1930 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1980) 83.
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On the other hand, it appears that fear of liability in contract, by
statute, or in tort for harm caused by toxic waste has induced businesses
to be more careful in the purchase and sale of real estate and in handling
such wastes. 172 During the 1980s, there has been a steady expansion of
lawsuits arising out of the discharge and disposal of toxic materials. As
we noted above, almost all this growth involved suits relating to property
damage rather than personal injuries. Causation is still difficult to
establish except for local problems such as groundwater contamination.
At best, one could say that the possibility of tort stits may deter some
polluters from certain discharges that would likely lead to litigation.
Furthermore, some tort suits may have provided the information and
publicity necessary to give rise to legislative or regulatory action-for
example, the Love Canal problem and associated lawsuits that contri-
buted to the passage of CERCLA. 173 But the large expenditures in the last
two decades for control of air and water pollution discharge are
overwhelmingly a response to legislative and regulatory initiatives, not to
tort suits for personal injury.
In contrast to this poor performance of the tort system for toxic
waste spills and disposal, the potential liability created by CERCLA has
caused many firms to evaluate their waste disposal strategies in order to
minimize potential liability. This has led to waste reduction, more
secure disposal of toxic waste, and legal arrangements to avoid liability.
There is evidence that firms expend significant resources to limit the risk
of spills of toxic substances and toxic waste property contamination that
will require expensive cleanup efforts arising from CERCLA, tort claims,
or claims based on contract. Still, CERCLA's retroactive strict joint and
several liability is inconsistent with optimal deterrence, and actual
collections have been modest to date. Brennan concludes that CERCLA
has had little success in reducing the health hazards arising from
hazardous waste sites during the 1980s.174
172 P. Reuter, The Economic Consequences of Expanded Corporate Liability: An Erploratory
Study (Santa Monica: Rand, 1988).
173 "Developments," supra, note 159 at 1471.
174 Brennan, supra, note 167.
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B. Compensation
The serious input limitations faced by plaintiffs with respect to
deterrence are equally disabling in pursuing the compensation goals of
corrective and distributive justice. There have been recent moves to
expand compensation, as some settlements have allowed damages for
medical monitoring for future health effects, for emotional distress
arising from fear of future disease, and for risk of future disease itself;175
but these measures of damages are still in their infancy. Adequate
compensatory performance for personal injuries is arguable only with
respect to corrective justice, and even then only in the small subset of
cases in which there is highly localized pollution that significantly
increases the incidence of a disease, so that the victims can establish
causation from a known polluter.
Turning to output measures, although some victims do recover
from polluters, their numbers are small in comparison to the number of
people affected by pollution, and their recoveries often fall short of full
compensation. 76  Worse yet, tort plaintiffs generally retain as
compensation only 46 per cent of all dollars spent on tort litigation and
37 per cent of all dollars spent on asbestos litigation, 177 with environ-
mental litigation probably falling between these two-not an impressive
level of administrative efficiency. Measured by deterrence, corrective
justice, or distributive justice, tort law is a minor factor with respect to
personal injuries arising from environmental pollution.
178
Recognition of the limitations of the tort system have led to
reform proposals to deal with three of the limitations identified in the
input analysis: proof of causation, standing to sue (the private property
limitation), and thinly spread damage.
Proof of causation might be facilitated in situations where
exposure to a contaminant increases the risk of contracting a disease by
allowing probabalistic proof of causation, imposing proportional liability,
and providing science panels to assist courts in dealing with complex
175 Huber, supra, note 166 at 145 and Abraham, supra, note 161 at 972-73.
1 76 Environmental Law Institute, supra, note 162. See also Brennan, supra, note 162.
1 7 7 Kakalik & Pace, supra, note 133.
178 This is reflected in the fact that a major casebook on environmental law, Grad, supra, note
156, devotes less than 8 per cent of its pages to tort law, the remainder dealing with statutory law.
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medical evidence.179 Unfortunately, reliable epidemiological data are
available for very few pollutants, so there are likely to be few substances
for which this set of proposals would yield reliably increased liability.
Inviting u.s. courts to find some liability for diseases suffered by large
numbers of injured people runs the risk of opening yet another giant
legal lottery in which the uncertainties of fact finding leave little likeli-
hood that justice or efficient deterrence will be done. The high cost of
the legal system ensures that considerable resources would be
consumed. In practice, the uncertainties -created by these proposals
would be considerable and the benefits modest.
Another type of reform would be to expand standing to sue by
not requiring that the plaintiff have suffered actual damage in order to
bring a claim for injunctive relief as is done by the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act 80 and other similar statutes. While the
proponents of such legislation correctly note that it has not unleashed a
flood of litigation, significant environmental results are difficult to prove
from the u.s. experience of the 1970s and 1980s.181
The wide dispersion of harm caused by many air and water
pollution discharges might be less discouraging to tort litigants if class
actions were facilitated. In the u.s., there are proposals to allow
mandatory class actions, and in Canada to provide looser rules for
bringing class actions1 8 2 To the extent that these proposals consolidate
actions that would otherwise be brought separately, they economize on
judicial resources. To the extent that they encourage litigation that
would not otherwise arise, and this is necessary if they are to increase
deterrence, their value depends upon the courts' ability to adjudicate the
issues fairly and at reasonable cost. The very limited data about the
harmful effects of most pollutants will mean that such litigation is highly
179 "Developments," supra, note 159 at 1619; Brennan, supra, note 162; and Shavell, supra,
note 2.
180 Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 691.1201 et seq. (1970).
181 D.P. Bryden, "Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice" (1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 163
and D.K. Slone, "The Michigan Environmental Protection Act: Bringing Citizen-Initiated
Environmental Suits into the 1980's" (1985) 12 Ecology LQ. 271.
182 D. Rosenberg, "Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means" (1987) 62 Ind. L J. 561 and S. Chester, "Class Actions to Protect the Environment: A Real
Weapon or Another Lawyer's Word Game?" in J. Swaigen, ed., Environmental Rights in Canada
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) 60.
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uncertain in its outcome and again considerable resources will be
consumed.
Whatever the overall merits of these reform proposals, we do not
believe that their adoption would substantially alter the conclusion that
many environmental discharges will not lead to tort litigation that
imposes on polluters the social cost of their pollution.
C. Regulatory Alternatives to the Tort System
A review of regulatory inputs reveals the limitations under which
the regulatory system labours. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has regulated six traditional air pollutants and seven hazardous air
pollutants,183 although there are dozens of additional pollutants thought
to be hazardous. It has also proceeded slowly with the promulgation of
water effluent regulations, but has finally imposed regulations on the
traditional pollutants for most point sources; again, the regulation of
toxic pollutants is thought to be seriously incomplete.184 The number of
pollutants and sources is enormous, and monitoring and enforcement
activity by the EPA and by the States affects only a very small proportion
of all sources in any given year. While enforcement activities are often
said to be inadequate, it is unlikely that budgets for these functions will
be greatly increased in the near future. These resource constraints
seriously limit both the pace at which regulations can be imposed and
the degree to which they can be enforced. It seems likely that even an
agency with the vast resources of the EPA will be able to act effectively
against only a limited number of pollutants and types of sources in any
given period of time.
Turning to outputs, the best measure of the effectiveness of
environmental regulation would be evidence of the ultimate effect of
regulation on human health and on the environment. If this is incon-
clusive, a secondary measure would be changes in the concentration of
pollutants in the environment, While a tertiary measure would be
changes in the rate of emission of those pollutants.
183 P.R. Portney, "Air Pollution Policy" in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra,
note 170, 27 at 40 and 80.
184 A.M. Freeman, "Water Pollution Policy" in Public Policies for Environmental Protection,
supra, note 170, 97 at 120.
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If the ultimate goal of environmental regulation is the
improvement of human health, it is difficult to document significant
gains since 1970. While the killer smogs such as the 1948 Donora
incident were eliminated by state and local pollution controls before
1970, concern has increased regarding chronic effects of urban air
pollution and of the increasing number of toxic chemicals being found in
the air and water. We have found no studies directly demonstrating that
human health has improved generally since 1970 as a result of
environmental regulation, nor that it has been prevented from
deteriorating, although the latter is more likely true. This does not mean
that there have been no health benefits, only that they cannot be
discerned in overall health, morbidity, and mortality statistics given the
variety of other factors influencing these statistics.
A secondary goal of environmental regulation is the reduction of
ambient pollution concentrations, which may lead to better human
health and to a more healthy ecosystem, even if those ultimate benefits
are difficult to document. Here, the record is mixed but generally
positive. Several measures of ambient air quality show improvements
over the last two decades, with reductions in airborne concentrations of
lead, carbon monoxide, and sulphur dioxide in the u.s. equal to, respec-
tively, 90 per cent, 46 per cent, and 47 per cent between 1975 and 1988,
despite considerable growth in economic activity.185 Achievements with
respect to surface water pollution have been more modest. Between
1972 and 1982, there were improvements in water quality in some
streams and estuaries, but declines occurred in some lakes and
reservoirs.186 We cannot assess the extent of contaminated soil and
groundwater, since little measurement of these factors was undertaken
prior to about 1980. While many projects have been undertaken to clean
up toxic waste sites, new contaminated sites are continually being
discovered and perhaps being created.
Finally, we can look at the rate of pollution emissions.
Substantial reductions in total annual emissions have occurred between
1970 and 1988 for all but one of the six criteria air pollutants, with
185 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, NationalAir Quality and Emissions Trends Report
1988 (Washington D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 1990) [hereinafter NationalAir Quality
Report].
186 Freeman, supra, note 184 at 120.
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Air Pollution Emissions Trends
(Millions of Metric Tonnes per Year)
Percentage
Pollutant 1970 1975 1988 Reduction 1970-88
Total Suspended Particles 18.1 10.2 7.0 62
Sulphur Oxide 28.2 26.0 21.1 25
Nitrogen Oxide 18.1 19.0 19.5 -8 (increase)
Volatile Organic Compounds 27.2 23.0 18.5 32
Carbon Monoxide 98.7 80.0 62.1 37
Leada 203.8 148.0 13.2 94
Percentage
Economic Activity Increase
Population (10) 205 216 246 20
GNP (1012 in 1982 dollars)c 2.42 2.69 4.02 66
Fossil Fuel Used 63.6 65.3 71.2 12
Coal Used 12.3 12.7 18.8 53
a Thousands of metric tonnes.
bStatistical Abstract of the United States, 1990. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, 110th ed., at 7.
C Ibid. at 425.
d Ibid.
Sources: EPA National Air Pollutant Emission Estimates 1940-85, and
EPA National Air Quality and Emissions Trends Report 1988.
Similarly, there have been reductions in the emission of some
water pollutants such as biochemical oxygen demand (BOb), suspended
187 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Air Pollution Emissions Estimates 1940-
1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1986) and National Air Quality
Report, supra, note 185.
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solids, and phosphorous from some sources,'8 8 although data on the
discharge of water pollutants is much less complete than for air
pollutants. These achievements are reflected in the costs of pollution
control, which have been estimated to have averaged over $50 billion (in
1984 dollars) per year in the u.s. during the 1980s.189 Considered in the
light of the simultaneous considerable growth in population and
economic activity, these absolute gains are impressive; emissions would
likely have grown considerably in the absence of regulation. Pollution
emission regulations usually apply to specific industries or products, so
their effectiveness may be measured by looking at emissions related to
individual industries or products. The regulation of motor vehicle
emissions, which may have accounted for one-quarter of all pollution
control costs during the last decade,190 has reduced emissions per vehicle
mile of four pollutants in the u.s. by amounts ranging from 26 per cent
(nitrogen oxides) to 94 per cent (lead). 191 After the effect of increased
motoring is accounted for, total vehicular emissions have risen by 18 per
cent for nitrogen oxides, and fallen by 35 per cent for carbon monoxide,
46 per cent for hydrocarbons, and 94 per cent for lead. Thus, the regula-
tion of a small number of automobile manufacturers to control a
pollution problem that is acknowledged to be severe in some parts of the
country has been relatively successful, although costs appear to exceed
the benefits by a substantial margin.192 There has been little regulation
of emissions of nitrogen oxides, except for motor vehicle regulations, so
it is not surprising that these emissions changed little between 1970 and
188 Luken presents data indicating that the pulp and paper industry reduced its water pollution
discharge (BOD and SS) by over 70 per cent between 1973 and 1984. R.A. Luken, Efficiency in
Environmental Regulation: A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Alternative Approaches (Boston: Kluwer
Academic, 1990) at 215. This is consistent with another study that found that, between 1978 and
1983, federal regulations had reduced pulp and paper discharges of BOD by 38 per cent and
suspended solids by about 30 per cent. M. Freedman & B. Jaggi, "Impact of Government
Regulations on Pollution Performance of Pulp and Paper Firms" (1988) 12 Envtl. Mgmt. 391 at 395.
189 Council on Environmental Quality, Eleventh Annual Report (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1980) at 394 and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Final Report,
the Cost of Clean Air and Water (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1984)
at 11, 12, 15, and 16.
190 D.W. Jorgenson & P.J. Wilcoxen, "Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic
Growth" (1990) 21 Rand J. Econ. 314 at 338.
1 91 NationalAir Pollution Emission Estimates 1940-1985, supra, note 187.
192 Crandall et al., supra, note 56 at 86.
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1988.193 The emission of particulates and sulphur oxides declined by 62
per cent and 25 per cent respectively between 1970 and 1988,194 in signif-
icant part because of regulations directed at the electric utility industry.
This has been achieved despite a 50 per cent increase in the use of coal
during this period. The discharge of some water pollutants from point
sources has declined significantly, but the failure to significantly regulate
non-point sources, which contribute more than half of the total loading
of many water pollutants, has led to very modest gains in overall water
quality.195 Furthermore, the costs of water pollution control appear to
exceed the quantifiable benefits thereof by a significant amount.
1 6
There are other isolated success stories such as the greatly reduced
mercury emissions from chlor-alkali plants, although regulation was only
one of several causes of this reduction.
197
To some extent, regulation has succeeded where tort failed, as in
the case of motor vehicle emission regulation. In other cases, both have
failed, often for similar reasons. If we are uncertain of the harm caused
by the pollution, and if it is difficult to trace the pollution from many
sources to a receptor, then not only is it unlikely that a private lawsuit
will succeed, but it is also difficult for the regulatory agency to impose an
effective regulation, and it is costly to enforce that regulation. The slow
progress in regulating toxic pollutants may be caused by many of the
same factors that render tort suits for toxic pollution difficult to pursue
in most cases. Furthermore, where a pollutant is emitted by many
sources of different types and where emission limits are technology-
based, the data requirements for standard setting are enormous, so
appropriate regulations may be promulgated only slowly. The federal
government has limited resources for the enforcement of the resulting
regulations for thousands of sources across the country, so years may
pass before significant compliance occurs. Finally, reliance on new
193 National Air Quality Report, supra, note 185.
194 Ibid
195 Freeman, supra, note 184 at 109.
196 ]bid. at 144.
197 D.N. Dewees, "The Effect of Environmental Regulation: Mercury and Sulphur Dioxide"
in M.L. Friedland, ed., Securing Compliance: Seven Case Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1990) 354 and J. Ashworth, I. Papps & D. Storey, "Assessing the Impact upon the British
Chlor-Alkali Industry of the EEC Directive on Discharges of Mercury into Waterways" (1987) 63
Land Econ. 72.
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source performance standards leaves existing sources untouched for
years or decades and may result in very modest reductions in total
emissions. All of these factors have contributed to a relatively slow pace
of overall abatement for most pollutants.
Studies by economists of the costs and benefits of pollution
regulation tend to show that the costs of u.s. federal water pollution
regulations in the 1970s and 1980s exceeded the benefits of those regula-
tions, while the reverse is true for air pollution.198 There is substantial
evidence that we have overregulated in many cases. However, it is also
possible that in some cases, while costs have been estimated with some
accuracy, those elements of benefits that are difficult to quantify have
been omitted. Fully reflecting public concerns about the ecosystem
damage, the ill health of urban forests, and other environmental harm
could yield benefits that justify the costs. Another possibility is that
some aspects of recent programmes can be justified on benefit-cost
grounds, while others cannot, so that the problem is not simply that we
have gone too far, but that we have gone too far in some parts of some
regulations and not far enough in other cases. Finally, it is clear that
many programmes have cost far more than necessary to achieve the
environmental goal because of inefficiently designed policies, so that
revision of the form of the regulation, rather than its goals, could yield
benefits that justified the costs. We suspect that all of these explanations
are true in part, so that no simple prescription, such as "regulate less,"
can be justified by the available data. We acknowledge, however, that
high costs relative to the benefits afflict some of the u.s. federal environ-
mental regulation of the 1970s and 1980s.
D. Compensatory Alternatives to the Tort System
There has been little legislation in the United States designed to
compensate victims of environmental pollution for personal injuries.
The Marshall Islanders Compensation Program, enacted in 1977,
provides $150 million in compensation for islanders harmed by atomic
198 See, generally, the evidence reviewed in Public Policies for Environmental Protection, supra,
note 170 and Freeman, supra, note 184.
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testing during 1954.199 The Price-Anderson Act200 governs liability for
injuries arising from nuclear accidents at nuclear power plants. The Act
relies on state law for liability doctrine, modifies that doctrine in certain
circumstances, and governs insurance coverage and liability limits for
nuclear power plants. The Superfund legislation 20 1 governs liability for
damage arising from waste disposal sites, but is designed to cover costs
of cleanup rather than personal injury, although the 1986 amendments
may facilitate personal injury suits in the future 202 There is no compre-
hensive legislation providing compensation for personal injuries arising
from environmental pollution.
VI. WORKPLACE INJURIES
In general, no-fault workers' compensation regimes have
replaced tort actions in North America as a means of compensating
victims of workplace accidents, while occupational health and safety
regulation has largely replaced the deterrence function of tort. The
empirical evidence on the efficacy of the tort system is to be found
largely in: (a) studies of the functioning of the tort system before
workers' compensation was introduced; (b) studies of certain specific
regimes in which tort survives, such as the legal regime covering railway
workers in the United States; and (c) studies that focus on industrial
disease and product liability claims which in the United States are not
excluded by workers' compensation law. Conclusions drawn from such
evidence must be qualified to the extent that they may reflect historical
conditions no longer relevant, the specific nature of the sector that has
adopted the tort system rather than workers' compensation, or the
peculiar problems associated with industrial diseases.
199 H. Ball, Justice Downwind: America's Atomic Testing Program in the 1950s (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
200 42 U.S.C.S. § 2210 (Law. Co-op. 1978).
201 CERCLA and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), in 42
U.S.C.S. §§ 9601 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1989).
202 42 U.S.CS. §§ 9671-75 (Law. Co-op. 1989). See Brennan, supra, note 167 at 176-78.
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A. Deterrence
At the time at which workers' compensation insurance was first
introduced, the tort law applicable to workplace accidents was in a
process of rapid evolution.2 03 The nineteenth century doctrines of
voluntary assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule, and contributory
negligence, which had barred tort recovery by many injured workers,
were being transformed or discarded, and workers were succeeding in an
increasing number of cases204 Throughout this period of transition,
negligence rather than strict liability defined the standard of care.205
However, causation was often difficult to prove, workers had some
reservations about bringing a lawsuit or testifying in favour of a plaintiff
for fear of impairing their relationship with the employer, and fatalities
were undervalued by the standard tort award. Occupational diseases
were largely ignored. Furthermore, low-income workers would have had
difficulty financing a lawsuit that was not reasonably likely to succeed
unless contingent fees were available. These input considerations
suggest that, although early in the period tort law could have had a
limited deterrent effect, by the end of the period of transition it could
offer substantial, although less than optimal, deterrence. If tort were to
replace workers' compensation today, the limitations regarding proof of
causation, concern about the employment relationship, and under-
valuing fatalities would remain. Indeed, one study of the choices
available to an asbestos manufacturer whose workers suffered "an occu-
pational health disaster" concluded that the expectation of full tort
liability for all the disease that actually occurred would not have
provided sufficient financial reason for the manufacturer to adopt fairly
modest ventilation devices to reduce exposures below those that led to
the disaster.2
0 6
203 LM. Friedman & J. Ladinsky, "Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents" (1967)
67 Colum. L Rev. 50.
204 G.T. Schwartz, "Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1717.
205 R. Epstein, "The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation
Law" (1982) 16 Ga. L Rev. 775.
206 D.N. Dewees, "Economic Incentives for Controlling Industrial Disease: The Asbestos
Case" (1986) 15 J. Legal Stud. 289.
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Turning to outputs, there has been very little empirical study of
how care and activity levels have been affected by tort liability for
occupational injury. Using statistics on deaths from non-motor vehicle
machinery accidents in the early part of the century, Chelius found that,
while both expanded tort liability and workers' compensation reduced
accidents, the rate of reduction was much greater for workers'
compensation than for expanded tort liability 0 7 Fishback's study of the
effects of workers' compensation on coal mining accidents between 1903
and 1930 reaches the opposite conclusion. The shift from very restricted
tort liability (that is, with the voluntary assumption of risk, fellow
servant, and contributory negligence defenses operative) to either
expanded tort liability or workers' compensation actually resulted in
higher accident rates.208 The latter findings conflict with anecdotal
evidence that employers in the coal industry actually responded to the
introduction of workers' compensation with its risk-rated premiums by
increasing safety precautions 209 Less formal evidence of the effects of
tort liability on accident rates is found in the introduction of the federal
Employers' Liability Act21° in 1908, which allowed considerably expanded
railroad liability, abolishing the contributory negligence defence in
favour of comparative negligence, and also abolishing the voluntary
assumption of risk defence211 From the turn of the century until 1908,
the number of railroad accidents that injured workers increased drama-
tically; however, the accident rate declined significantly thereafter.
212
Finally, we can compare the exposure of workers to asbestos
since 1970 in the United States, where workers exposed to asbestos have
brought an avalanche of product liability lawsuits against asbestos
producers and suppliers, with exposures of similar workers in Ontario,
207 J.R. Chelius, "Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict
Liability Systems" (1976) 5 J. Legal Stud. 293 at 305.
208 P.V. Fishback, "Liability Rules and Accident Prevention in the Workplace: Empirical
Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century" (1987) 16 J. Legal Stud. 305 at 318.
209 W. Graebner, Coal Mining Safety in the Progressive Period (Lexington, Ken.: University of
Kentucky Press, 1976).
210 45 U.S.C.S. §§ 51 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1989).
211 V.E. Schwartz & L. Mahshigian, "The Federal Employers' Liability Act, a Bane for
Workers, a Bust for Railroads, a Boon for Lawyers" (1986) 23 San Diego L Rev. 1.
212 F.H. Hare, "Actions for Personal Injuries and Death of Railroad Workers" (1965) 17 Ala.
L. Rev. 201.
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where, because of differences in the workers' compensation legislation,
there has been no such litigation2 3 There was no significant difference
in supplier warnings about the hazards of the product, and no significant
difference in worker exposure levels, but there was a greater reduction in
asbestos use in the United States than in Canada.214 The reduction in
asbestos use may be a consequence of the litigation, but it may not have
been efficient, given the low worker exposures prevailing at the time.
Although this limited evidence is not conclusive, it does suggest that
even massive tort litigation may not achieve ends substantially different
from those achieved through collective bargaining, workers' compen-
sation, and the regulatory system.
B. Compensation
The application of the corrective justice criterion to the
workplace raises a conceptual question about the role of corrective
justice in a contractual setting, where some have argued that the
question is whether the harm suffered by the worker goes beyond that
which was implicit or explicit in the bargain between the parties. On the
assumption that some workplace injuries may have been subsumed in
the bargain, then when combined with the bargain, the tort doctrines
applicable at the end of the "transition" period, even though they fell
short of optimal deterrence, 'would more closely satisfy the corrective
justice objective. However, the practical impediments to suit, discussed
above, also impede the achievement of corrective justice.
Turning to outputs, there is evidence of substantial and
successful litigation by injured workers prior to the advent of workers'
compensation? 15 However, it appears that the compensation awarded
generally fell far short of full compensation for the injuries suffered,
particularly in the case of fatally injured workers. In New York in 1910,
survivors rarely recovered more than a few years' worth of the
213 The Ontario Workmens' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, s. 8(9) prohibits an
employee from suing, not just his own employer, but any employer in Schedule 1, which includes
most private companies in the province, including Johns-Manville, the largest supplier of asbestos.
214 D.N. Dewees & R. Daniels, "Prevention and Compensation of Industrial Disease" (1988) 8
Int'l Rev. L & Econ. 51 at 63-66.
215 Schwartz, supra, note 204 and J.L. Croyle, "Industrial Accident Liability Policy of the Early
Twentieth Century" (1978) 7 J. Legal Stud. 279.
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deceased's wages and retained only 40 per cent of this meagre amount
after legal fees and costs were deducted1
6 In Pennsylvania in 1915,
under expanded tort liability, the average settlement for the fatality of a
coal miner was just over one year's wage.
217 Even today, it appears that
compensation under product liability suits for risks to health and life
falls far short of the value that workers place on these risks,
218 because
the damages are designed only to compensate the survivors
2 19
With respect to distributive justice concerns, the tort system that
existed at the turn of the century was based on negligence, not strict
liability; many injured workers could not recover from their employer
because of the absence of negligence. This limitation is in addition to
the limitations of doctrine and practicality outlined above in the
discussion of deterrence. Furthermore, many of those who were compen-
sated were undercompensated. We conclude that the compensation
actually paid in fact fell far short of achieving distributive justice goals.
C. Regulatory Alternatives to Tort Law
The evaluation of inputs reveals a number of limitations on the
deterrent capability of alternatives to the tort system. Consider first the
command-and-control regulatory system. The determination of which
problems to regulate is subject to little formal guidance for the u.s.
federal Occupational and Safety Health Administration (OSHA), but
there are some suspicions as to whether osHA. established the correct
priorities.220 Once a problem is addressed, osHA attempts to regulate
highly diverse workplaces using regulations of general applicability,
which imposes costs greater than could be achieved by a more flexible
approach.221 Worse, the legislation precludes explicit reference to costs
216 Friedman & Ladinsky, supra, note 203.
217 Fishback, supra, note 208.
218 Viscusi, supra, note 135.
219 W.G. Johnson & E. Heler, "Compensation for Death from Asbestos" (1984) 
37 Indus. &
Lab. Rel. Rev. 529.
220 W.K. Viscusi, "Reforming OSHA Regulation of Workplace Risks" in L Weiss 
& M. Kass,
eds, RegulatoryReforf: WhatActuall Happened (Toronto: Brown, 1986) 234 at 246-52.
221 ibid. at 248.
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in determining a standard, which has led to excessively strict standards insome cases, while other standards are insufficient.222
Studies have shown that only a fraction, between one-quarterand one-third, of workplace injuries are of a type that could be avoided
through government regulation. 223 Because the actual regulations thathave been adopted do not cover all preventable injuries and because
they are not ideal in form, the proportion of accidents that could beavoided by perfect enforcement of current regulations is lower still,
perhaps one-fifth224 or one-tenth.225 While accident risks are imper-fectly covered, health risks may be more seriously neglected, which isunfortunate since health risks are less likely than accident risks to be
perceived and avoided by the workers themselves. 226
Enforcement, of course, is not perfect. OSHA inspectors visit aworkplace on average once every twenty years, and in a given year,
workplaces employing only a few million workers are inspected.227
These inspections give rise to citations for violations of only about 15 percent of all OSHA standards in any year, in part because inspectors cannotbe familiar with all 4,000 standards.228 The penalties for violating osHA
regulations have been quite small. In 1983, the average was $57 perviolation and the total was $6 million, both down substantially from a
few years earlier.229 Considering the size of the penalty and theprobability of being inspected and cited, the expected penalty is clearlytoo small to constitute a deterrent when compliance imposes any signif-
222 W.K. Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).
223 W.Y. Oi, "On the Economics of Industrial Safety" (1973) 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 669
and R.S. Smith, The Occupational Safety and Health Act: Its Goals and Achievements (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976).
224 Ibid.
225 J. Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: An Economic and PoliticalAnalysis of Occupational Safety
and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979) and A. Bartel & L. Thomas, "Direct and
Indirect Effects of OSHA Regulation" (1985) 28 J. L & Econ. 1 at 20.
226 Viscusi, supra, note 220 at 244.
227/bid.
22 R.S. Smith, "Protesting Workers' Safety and Health" in R.W.J. Poole, ed., Instead of
Regulation (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1982) 311.
2 29 W.K. Viscusi, "The Structure and Enforcement of Job Safety Regulation" (1986) 49:4 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 127 at 136 and 139.
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icant cost. While workers may use a conviction or citation in bargaining
for improved safety in the workplace, the low frequency of citations
leaves the overall deterrent effect at a low level.
With these disabilities, we do not expect to find that the
establishment of OSIA would have had a substantial direct effect on
worker health and safety. The interaction of workers and employers and
changes in workplace culture regarding occupational health and safety
seem likely to have a far greater effect. This is confirmed by the output
data. Workplace accident rates have been declining at about 2 per cent
per year for the last half century, and it is difficult to attribute this
reduction to any particular regulatory initiative- 0 Studies of aggregate
data for the 1970s suggest that OSIA had little effect,231 but studies of
later data suggest that some accident reduction occurred, perhaps
because OSIA had learned how to deploy its resources more
effectively.23 2 Case studies of individual regulations have indicated that
some effect may result from regulations targeted on particular industries
or hazards 233 When the costs and benefits of workplace regulations are
evaluated, they are often found to be similar, indicating that the
regulatory effort was justified, although marginally. However, in a
number of individual regulations, the costs have been found to be quite
high compared to any reasonable evaluation of the benefits.23
4
Workers' compensation is designed primarily to compensate
workers, with deterrence of harmful behaviour as a distinctly secondary
goal. Because many workers are covered by insurance that is not
experience rated or only partially experience rated, we would not expect
high levels of deterrence to arise from the workers' compensation
system. In the case of occupational disease, the long time lags between
worker exposure to hazardous substances and filing of claims for
230 Viscusi, supra, note 220 at 260.
231 Smith, supra, note 223; W.K. Viscusi, "The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health
Regulation" (1979) 10 Bell J. Econ. 117; Mendeloff, supra, note 225; and D.P. McCaffery, "An
Assessment of OSHA's Recent Effects on Injury Rates" (1983) 18 J. Hum. Resources 131.
232 Viscusi, supra, note 220 at 262 and J.T. Scholz & W.B. Gray, "OSHA Enforcement and
Workplace Injuries: A Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment" (1990) 3 J. Risk & Uncertainty
283.
233 Mendeloff, supra, note 225 and W.K. Viscusi, "Cotton Dust Regulation: An OSHA
Success Story?" (1985) 4 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 325.
234 Mendeloff, ibid.; Viscusi, ibid.; and Smith, supra, note 228.
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industrial disease further reduce the deterrent effect. Loss management
programmes by insurers probably restore only a small measure of
deterrence. It is important to recognize, however, that workers'
compensation premiums amount to tens of billions of dollars per year,
thousands of times the level of OSHA fines, so even modest premium
differentials will cost far more than the expected fine for violating
regulatory standards. In fact, studies have found that experience-rated
premiums can significantly reduce accident rates235 and that the level of
benefits can also influence the accident rate.23 6 The most dramatic
finding is the most recent: Moore and Viscusi conclude that the occupa-
tional fatality rate in u.s. would have been 20-27 per cent higher were it
not for the deterrent effect of workers' compensation, 237 implying that
workers' compbnsation has been far more effective than OSHA, for which
the effects on risk levels have been estimated at 2-4 per cent or less, in
protecting workers' lives.
Criminal sanctions are not applied sufficiently frequently to give
rise to a significant deterrent effect, and despite pleas from labour to jail
corporate executives when workers are seriously or fatally injured, it
seems unlikely that many cases will arise where the facts would justify
using this sanction. Information policies that provide employers and
employees information about job hazards, particularly the hazards posed
by chemicals in the workplace, have been used in both Canada and the
u.s. and are thought to have some effect, particularly for occupational
health problems.238
235 J.W. Ruser, "Workers' Compensation Insurance, Experience Rating and Occupational
Injuries" (1985) 16 Rand J. Econ. 487 and J.D. Worrall & R. Butler, "Benefits and Duration of
Claims" in J.D. Worrall & D. Appel, eds, Workers' Compensation Benefits: Adequacy, Equiy, and
Efficiency (Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Cornell University, 1985) 57 [hereinafter Workers' Compensation Benefits].
236 J.R. Chelius, "The Control of Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Empirical
Evidence" (1974) 38 Law & Contemp. Probs. 700; McCaffrey, supra, note 231; and Ruser, ibid.
237 MJ. Moore & W.K. Viscusi, Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1990) c. 9 and W.X. Viscusi, "Product and Occupational Liability"
(Presentation to the University of Toronto Law and Economics Workshop, 1990-91) at 12
[unpublished].
238 S.D. Carle, "A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to Suppress under
OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard" (1988) 97 Yale I.J. 581 and J. Mendeloff, The Dilemma
of Toxic Substance Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).
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Overall we conclude that occupational health and safety
regulation at the federal, state, and local level has had a beneficial effect,
but that the effect of the federal regulatory programme has not been
large. Arguably, the provision of information, the evolution of general
public attitudes toward worker health and safety, and workplace
negotiations regarding health and safety issues have had considerably
more impact. In the workplace, where workers have a direct interest in
their own health and safety and where the employer shares a portion of
that interest, the need for remote government intervention is modest.
The workers' compensation system appears to fulfil an important role in
promoting workplace safety, both by creating incentives for the employer
and by implicitly providing information regarding workplace risks to
both employer and employee. Still, standards set by government provide
information about risks and prevention and may help to shape the
environment within which the workplace bargaining takes place, so that
the abolition of those standards might have a substantial adverse effect.
D. Compensatory Alternatives to the Tort System
Here we are principally concerned with workers' compensation
regimes. A review of inputs to workers' compensation claims reveals
several important barriers to successful recovery. It is difficult for many
disease claimants to establish that their disease arises out of their
workplace exposure.239 However, the problem here, equally serious in
tort, is scientific uncertainty, not a defect in the workers' compensation
system. It is not necessary to prove fault, simplifying the claimant's
problems compared to tort. Many jurisdictions formerly required that a
claim be filed soon after the last exposure, which effectively precluded
most claims for diseases of long latency; but the predominant require-
ment today is that filing follow after discovery of the disease, not unlike
the discovery rule for tort statutes of limitation. 240 Finally, many victims
of occupational disease may not be aware that their disease arose from
239 P.S. Barth & H.A. Hunt, Workers' Compensation and Work-Related Illnesses and Diseases
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980).
240 P.S. Barth, "On Efforts to Reform Workers' Compensation for Occupational Diseases" in
J.R. Chelius, ed., Current Issues in Workers' Compensation (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Insti-
tute for Employment Research, 1986) 327.
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workplace exposure or that they have a right to compensation, a
problem that is concentrated in workplaces that are small or non-
unionized.2 41 In tort, this problem might be alleviated by an aggressive
plaintiffs' bar seeking out workplaces and victims.
The benefits offered by workers' compensation covers medical
costs and a large proportion of net lost wages. There is no compensation
for reduced performance off the job, lost enjoyment of life, or pain and
suffering.242 This reduction in compensation from that available under
tort is offset by the much shorter wait for the receipt of benefits.
Most workers in the u.s. and Canada are covered by workers'
compensation, and those that are iot have recourse to tort. Surveys
have found, however, that only 40 to 50 per cent of those hospitalized for
injuries during working time have their medical costs paid by workers'
compensation, in part because of waiting periods before benefits begin
to accrue.243 Unfortunately, there is evidence that a much smaller
fraction of those with occupationally related diseases apply for or receive
compensation because of ignorance or because of strict disease eligibility
guidelines 244 With respect to wage replacement, most of those who
receive such benefits receive 90 per cent or more of their net lost wages.
Low-income workers are likely to fully replace lost wages, while high-
income workers may receive only two-thirds because of payment
limits.245 In the past, limits on weekly payments and on the duration of
payments led to serious undercompensation of the severely disabled, a
situation that has improved to the extent that many believe that current
benefit levels are, at last, adequate. One exception is the failure of most
states to tie benefits to inflation, which may lead to the long term
impoverishment of those with permanent disabilities. The general
conclusion, therefore, is' that workers' compensation appears to
adequately compensate most injured workers, with a few specific areas,
such as long term disability and occupational disease, still falling short.
241 Barth & Hunt, supra, note 239 and P.C. Weiler, Protecting the Worker from Disability:
Challenges for the Eighties (Toronto: Ministry of Labour, 1983).
242 J.D. Worrall & D. Appel, "Some Benefit Issues in Workers' Compensation" in Workers'
Compensation Benefits, supra, note 235, 1.
243 D. Hensler et al.,supra, note 15.
244 J.D. Worrall, "Nominal Costs, Nominal Prices, and Nominal Profits" in Current Issues in
Workers' Compensation, supra, note 240, 251.
2 45 WorraU & Appel, supra, note 242.
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There is substantial evidence that workers' compensation sys-
tems deliver their benefits more efficiently than the tort system. Admin-
istrative costs consume 10 to 20 per cent of workers' compensation
premiums in the u.s246 and 10 per cent in Ontario,247 compared to close
to 50 per cent for the tort system, in addition to which workers'
compensation handles many small claims that would not be brought
under a tort system. Delays between injury and compensation are also
much shorter under workers' compensation than under tort law.
24
This relatively impressive performance of the workers'
compensation system, and its considerable advantages and modest dis-
advantages relative to tort, may explain why criticism of workers'
compensation over many decades has consistently led to reform and to
adjustment rather than to abolition.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Where does this review of the empirical evidence on the efficacy
of the tort system lead us? With respect to deterrence, the evidence in
each of the five categories of accidents reviewed is quite mixed: first, in
terms of what impact the civil liability system has on behaviour, and
second, in terms of whether such liability induced changes in behaviour
as have occurred have moved us closer to the social optimum. The
deterrent properties of the tort system seem strongest with respect to
auto accidents and weakest with respect to environmentally related
accidents. The incentive effects of the system are mixed in the case of
medical malpractice and product related accidents, making net welfare
judgments highly problematic. In the case of workplace accidents,
workers' compensation levies appear to have stronger deterrent effects
than the tort system did have or might have if resurrected in this context.
With respect to an expansive distributive justice perspective, the tort
system appears to fail badly in all five areas, the failure being most
severe with respect to environmentally related injuries, product related
2 46 W.K. Viscusi, "Lessons from Workers' Compensation for Tort Liability Reform" (John R.
Commons Lecture, University of Wisconsin, 1990) [unpublished] and Weiler, supra, note 87 at 139.
2 4 7 Weiler, supra, note 241.
248 R. Conley & J. Noble, Workers' Compensation and Reform: Challenge for the 80's
(Interdepartmental Research Report) (1979) at 57 [unpublished].
1992]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
injuries, and medically induced injuries. With respect to a corrective
justice perspective, the tort system appears to perform reasonably well in
the automobile accident context, but much less well with respect to
medically induced injuries and environmentally related injuries. Its
performance from this perspective with respect to product related
accidents is unclear.
While this is a relatively bleak scorecard, it is crucial to ask:
compared to what? This requires an evaluation of the existing empirical
evidence on the alternative deterrent and compensatory instruments to
the tort system, using similar measures of performance to those that we
have applied to the tort system. With respect to deterrence, the
empirical evidence on the efficacy of penal and regulatory alternatives to
the tort system in the five accident contexts of concern to us is also
decidedly mixed.
In the case of traffic safety, penal sanctions that focus on
individual driver behaviour appear to be of limited efficacy in reducing
the accident and injury rate, although recent mandatory seat-belt laws
appear to yield significant safety gains. Also, despite early controversy,
empirical evidence now suggests that significant safety gains have been
realized from motor vehicle design standards. Exposure-limiting
regulatory strategies, such as raising the drinking and driving age and
graduated licensing regimes for young or inexperienced drivers, have
also been effective.
With respect to medical malpractice, current licensing regimes
and correlative disciplinary mechanisms, for the most part, do not focus
on negligence or incompetence and appear to have little impact on the
quality of post-entry medical care. Voluntary or mandatory continuing
education programmes also appear to have only a marginal impact on
the quality of medical care. Quality assurance and risk management
programmes that are designed to uncover and redress specific practice
deficiencies at either the individual practitioner or institutional level
appear to be somewhat more effective, although the adoption of both
kinds of programmes seems to have been driven, in significant part, by
the escalating costs of the liability system. Thus, tort law can claim some
credit for inducing these regulatory responses. However, the achieve-
ments of both the tort system and regulatory alternatives, or
complements thereto, in reducing the incidence of substandard medical
care have been modest indeed.
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With respect to product related accidents, other than motor
vehicle accidents, regulatory interventions appear to have had only a
modest effect on the injury rate and have often entailed costs wholly
disproportionate to the benefits.
Turning to environmentally related accidents, environmental
regulation has registered some notable successes in reducing pollutant
emissions that seem well beyond the reach of the tort system, although in
some cases entailing costs disproportionate to the benefits. In other
cases, potentially hazardous toxic substances have not attracted
regulatory attention. Here, factors that have disabled the tort system as
a deterrent instrument have also hampered the regulatory
system-uncertain causation, scientifically controversial etiologies,
multiple sources, and dispersed victims.
In the case of workplace safety, federal safety regulations have
had a modest impact on workplace injury rates, again sometimes
entailing costs wholly disproportionate to the benefits. Moreover, many
occupational health hazards (as opposed to workplace injuries) have not
been effectively addressed by regulatory policies. Indeed, the safety
effects of workers' compensation levies appear to dwarf the safety effects
realized by federal regulation.
With respect to compensation, alternative compensation regimes
to the tort system have played a marginal role with rqspect to medical,
product, and environmentally related personal injuries both in the u.s.
and in most other jurisdictions. In the case of medically related injuries,
experience with programmes in New Zealand and Sweden suggests that
no-fault compensation systems are viable alternatives to the tort system.
Although they suffer from weak internalization of accident costs to
wrongdoers, no-fault systems hold out the promise of compensating a
wider range of victims more expeditiously and at lower administrative
cost. In the case of traffic related accidents, the empirical evidence
suggests that various kinds of no-fault compensation systems can again
deliver compensatory benefits, at least for pecuniary losses, at lower
administrative cost and with greater speed than the tort system. Even
with substantial risk rating of premiums or contributions to such
schemes, there is still debate whether a significant loss in deterrence
arises from curtailment or abrogation of the tort system. With respect to
workplace injuries or disabilities, workers' compensation schemes
appear to deliver relatively complete compensation for pecuniary losses
(except for long term disability) at relatively low administrative cost and
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more expeditiously than the tort system, as well as achieving significant
safety gains. More individualized risk rating of workers' compensation
levies than is typically the case at present holds out the potential for even
greater safety gains? 49 However, workers' compensation schemes have
performed much less well with respect to occupationally related illness
than to physical injuries. As with the tort system, problems of causation
in settings involving complex etiologies and confounding intervening
factors significantly afflict the claims adjudication process.
Beyond these injury-specific alternative compensation schemes,
the availability of more general sources of compensation must be
evaluated in assessing the compensation gaps in each of the foregoing
contexts. Rounding out the total compensation picture are privately
held life insurance, health insurance, and sick leave and disability
insurance, as well as social insurance benefits, such as retirement
benefits, survivors' benefits, disability benefits, Medicare, Medicaid, and
Supplemental Security Income. Table 4 summarizes the relative contri-
butions of various sources of compensation for injury and illness in the
u.s. for the years 1960, 1982, and 1984.
249 Weiler, supra, note 241 at 113-16.
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Table 4
Benefits Paid for Injury and Illness by Principal
Loss-Shifting Systems, 1960, 1982, 1984
Percentage of Total
Loss-Shifting Mechanism 1960 1982 1984
Total Tort (including no-fault) 7.9% 8.8% 9.8%
Workers' & Other Employment-
Mandated Compensation 5.4% 5.0% 5.3%
Private Loss Insurance 36.5% 29.1% 31.0%
Sick Leave 5.1% 3.0% 2.8%
Social Insurance 18.1% 30.8% 28.9%
Public Assistance 6.3% 11.0% 11.1%
Veterans' Benefits 7.3% 5.4% 5.1%
Other Public Health 9.4% 3.7% 3.2%
Private Health 4.0% 3.0% 2.8%
Total Benefits Paid 100% 100% 100%
Columns do not add perfectly due to rounding.
Source: 3. O'Connell & J. Guinivan, "An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of
Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance" (1988) 49 Ohio St. UJ. 757 at
759.
Three general points can be made about this mixed system of
compensation. First, while the above table aggregates only injury and
illness, a recent Rand study of compensation for non-fatal injuries from
accidents in the u.s. similarly finds that the tort system contributes a
small fraction-about 7 per cent-of total compensation for economic
losses from injury.250 However, in particular contexts, especially auto
accidents, tort law assumes a more prominent role, accounting for 22 per
cent of compensation for economic losses in this context. 251 Second, the
plethora of compensatory systems in place lead to various problems of
250 D. Hensler et aL, Compensation forAccidental Injuries in the United States (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1991).
251 bid. at 107-08.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
co-ordination among them, creating common instances of both over and
undercompensation 2 52 Third, even setting aside these co-ordination
problems, there are still very significant and systematic gaps in
compensation coverage for injury and illness. For example, about 18 per
cent of the u.s. population hold no private insurance for medical costs
(about 40 million people), while others are significantly underinsured.
Nevertheless, the Rand study estimates that 84 per cent of the costs of
basic health care with respect to injuries from accidents in the u.s. were
borne by some source other than the injured individual. With the
supplementation of Medicare, this figure approaches 93 per cent for the
elderly, although most injured persons were not reimbursed for other
health care expenses such as special equipment, home modifications,
help with home chores, and vocational rehabilitation. 253 However, much
more serious gaps exist with respect to income loss arising from non-
occupationally induced disability. The Rand study found that about one-
quarter of injuries occurred while people were engaged in home
activities, another quarter while people were on the job or on their way
to and from work, and about 30 per cent while people were engaged in
leisure activities. About one-third of accidents occurred in private
residences, one-quarter on streets and highways, and about 8 per cent on
industrial or construction sites.254 Over all types of accidents, individuals
bear about 38 per cent of the pecuniary costs directly in out-of-pocket
payments or in reduced earnings. 255 While those experiencing short-
term work loss recover about 66 per cent of their pre-tax income loss,
those unable to work permanently or restricted significantly in the work
they can perform recover only about 20 per cent of their pre-tax income
loss?56 Moreover, these data relate to non-fatal injuries from accidents,
and one would expect the compensation gaps to be substantially more
severe with respect to fatalities and especially illness related disabilities.
This has led to criticisms of workers' compensation schemes as reflecting
an "industrial preference," or even much broader accident compen-
252 See J. O'Connell & J. Barker, "Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the
Conrad-Morgan Tabulations" (1986) 47 Ohio St. LJ. 913 at 914-18.
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sation schemes, such as the New Zealand Accident Compensation
Plan,257 as reflecting an "accident preference." 258 However, creating
general compensation or social insurance schemes for illness related
disabilities259 or other misfortunes that lead to income interruptions or
deficiencies must confront the widely differential severity of the moral
hazard problem for causal agents and claimants that arises in the various
misfortune contexts that might plausibly engage our concern.2 60 Thus, a
general social insurance alternative to the tort system, with non-risk
rated financial contributions and high levels of income coverage, does
not seem a feasible alternative2 61
In the final analysis, our review of the empirical evidence leads
us to a relatively bleak judgment about the properties of the tort system
as a deterrent mechanism and an even bleaker evaluation of the tort
system as a compensatory mechanism. In most of the accident contexts
that we have reviewed, regulatory alternatives seem to hold out more
promise than the tort system from a deterrence perspective, 262 although,
unfortunately, their adoption has sometimes been motivated by the
threat of tort liability (and may not have occurred in its absence). Much
room also exists for improving regulatory performance in all the accident
contexts we have reviewed,263 but even with improvement it will retain
many deficiencies.
257 See T.G. Ison, Accident Compensation: A Commentary on the New Zealand Scheme
(London: Croom Helm, 1980).
258 See Trebilcock, supra, note 63.
259 Illness related disabilities are estimated at ten times the disabilities caused by accidents.
Ibid at 41.
260 /bid.
261 For an opposing argument and a detailed set of proposals, see S.D. Sugarman, DoingAway
with Personal Injury Law: New Compensation Mechanisms for Victims, Consumers, and Business
(New York: Quorum Books, 1989) and review thereof by MJ. Trebilcock, (1992) 42 U.T.LJ. 132.
262 On this issue, generally, see S. Shavell, "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety"
(1984) 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 and D. Wittman, "Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability. The Choice
Between Input and Output Monitoring" (1977) 6 J. Legal Stud. 193.
263 See, for example, C.R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory
State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990); R. Howse, "Retrenchment, Reform or
Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the Future of the Regulatory State" Alta L. Rev.
(forthcoming); and R. Howse, J.R.S. Prichard & M.J. Trebilcock, "Smaller or Smarter
Government?" (1990) 40 U.T.LJ. 498.
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With respect to compensation, workers' compensation seems
widely accepted as a superior alternative to the tort system in the case of
workplace accidents. Automobile no-fault schemes and perhaps medical
misadventure no-fault schemes seem to exhibit superior compensatory
qualities to the tort system and far lower administrative costs. However,
there is unresolved controversy in both cases as to the extent of the
deterrence losses that are likely to be sustained by curtailment or
abolition of the tort system in these contexts. In the case of product and
environmentally related injuries, no general compensatory alternatives
to the tort system for personal injuries readily suggest themselves. Here,
and in other accident and disability contexts, we are left with no
alternative but to attempt to co-ordinate in a more rational fashion the
present mix of tort and private and social insurance sources of compen-
sation, and to close some of the more glaring compensation gaps with
respect to health care costs and particularly income losses in the case of
long term disabilities.
